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Abstract A medium fidelity and low cost training device for pilots, called the Multi Aircraft Training 
Environment (MATE), is developed to replace other low fidelity stand-alone training devices and in-
tegrate them into a flexible environment, primarily aimed at training pilots in checklist procedures. 
The cockpit switches and instruments in MATE are computer-generated graphics. The graphics are 
back projected onto semi-transparent touch screen panels in a hybrid cockpit mock-up. Thus, the 
MATE is relatively cheap, it is always available, it is reconfigurable (e.g. between types of air-
craft/models to be simulated) and with possibilities for including various forms of intelligent computer 
assistance. This training concept and the technology are not specific to aviation, but can be used to 
simulate various types of control panels in different domains. The training effectiveness of pilots’ pro-
cedure training in the MATE prototype was compared with the effects of traditional training that in-
cluded the use of real aircraft. The experimental group (EXP) trained the pre-start checklist and the 
engine start checklist for the Saab 340 commuter aircraft in a MATE prototype. The control group 
(CTR) trained the same procedures using the aircraft (a/c) for training the pre start and a desktop com-
puter tool (power plant trainer) for training engine starts. Performance on the pre-start checklist was 
compared in a formal checkout that took place in the a/c. Performance on the engine start procedure 
was compared in a full flight simulator (FFS). The conclusion was, firstly, that training in the MATE 
prototype can result in an equally good performance as the existing training (a/c and computer tools), 
provided that the MATE trainees are given time to familiarise themselves with the a/c. Secondly, 
training in MATE can result in better performance during dynamic tasks, such as abnormal engine 
starts. This is promising for the further development of the MATE concept. 
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1 Introduction 
The MATE project was initiated to look into the possibility of building a low cost and me-
dium fidelity training device that would be sufficient for training procedures, i.e. one would 
like to avoid training of procedures in much more costly training environments (i.e. a very 
high degree of realism). At the same time there is no sufficient low cost training device today 
that can offer this optimum combination of training effectiveness and cost. Today, much of 
the initial training is performed in a paper mock-up with photographs of the cockpit, called a 
paper tiger. Training of more dynamic tasks, i.e. tasks that require system feedback, is per-
formed in various types of desktop computer tools or in relatively expensive high fidelity 
cockpit systems simulators. Finally the training is finished in real aircraft and full flight simu-
lators. In general terms it appears that the fidelity of training devices for training procedures is 
either (too) low or (too) high. Extensive use of the a/c for training procedures is vulnerable to 
costly delays of the training course and ineffective use of training time (e.g. this evaluation 
was delayed by several weeks because of this). There is therefore a need for a cost-effective 
training device filling this gap. 
 
A computer generated “virtual” training environment may have the capability of meeting 
these needs. Such a training device could incorporate many of the stand-alone low fidelity 
training devices, and it could also include parts of the more theoretical computer-based train-
ing. Further more, it could log the training activity in various tasks and use this to provide 
helpful feedback to the trainee. Such a device can have all the aircraft versions (types) needed 
stored on disk. In sum, a computer generated “virtual” environment would be cost effective in 
use if it can provide a sufficient quality of the procedural training. When fully developed, 
such a system could be put to use in all types of training were high fidelity is less important, 
e.g. flying by instruments, crew resource management (CRM) training and preliminary testing 
of new instrumentation. From a research point of view, there would be a benefit in the ability 
to produce many versions of an instrument just by changing computer graphics. 
 
The main issue in relation to effects of training was the system-input device. In a hardware 
model of a specific aircraft, real aircraft parts are used for switches, controls and instruments. 
In MATE the trainee had to interact with graphical representations of the real environment. 
This could have been done through a mouse or perhaps through a VR helmet with glows. 
However, a high fidelity was required in terms of rehearsing spatial relationships. (The gra-
phical resolution in low cost VR helmets was not high enough at the time to present all the 
details on the cockpit panels.) A solution with back projection on a semi-transparent touch 
screen panel was developed. In order to investigate to what extent this was a sufficient solu-
tion, it was necessary to determine if two-dimensional picture like representations of switches 
(and controls) could provide the necessary training for operating real switches (and controls). 
A literature study (D211) and an experimental pre study (D214, see also D231) were con-
ducted to look into this question. The preliminary answer was that it should be possible to 
achieve the same effect of training by using touch screen inputs (see Andersen H.B. and Han-
sen J.P., 1996). 
 
This MATE evaluation had as the main objective to evaluate a complete training environ-
ment, consisting of the touch screen cockpit panels mounted in a cockpit mock-up with added 
paper tiger parts (and demo objects) for the parts of the cockpit equipment that were not simu-
lated using touch screens. To what extent would learning effects of training in the MATE be 
transferred to the real environment? As a minimum, pilot trainees should be able to manage 
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tasks in the real environment after a relatively short familiarisation time before MATE has 
proven to be a cost/effective alternative to existing training. 
1.1 The Training Environments 
The MATE project has collaborated with Skyways, a small regional airline in Sweden (lo-
cated at Arlanda), and used their training on the Saab 340 aircraft as a MATE demonstrator. 
The Saab 340 is a commuter aircraft usually set up with approximately 30 seats. There are 
two versions of this aircraft, the A-type and the B-type. Both types have been used during this 
evaluation of MATE, but there are only minor differences between these two Saab versions. 
The training has several parts, but we are exclusively focusing on the technical training and 
the training of engine starts in a full flight simulator at SAS Flight Academy in Sweden (also 
located at Arlanda). 
 
The technical training is aimed at managing the pre start checklist procedures. The technical 
training taking place at Skyways consists of classroom lectures, various computer based self 
studies, training in the paper tiger, training in the power plant trainer and training in the real 
aircraft (see below). The technical training ends with theoretical and practical tests. The prac-
tical test is a formal checkout on the pre start checklist in the aircraft (a/c). When this is com-
pleted, the training continues in the full flight simulator (FFS). 
 
All parts of the checklist procedures studied here are taking place on the ground. Several trai-
ning environments with various levels of fidelity may be used for this type of training. The 
following describes the training environments used at Skyways during the MATE evaluation: 
 
• The Paper Tiger: paper pictures/posters with good photos of the real cockpit in life size 
and with correct spatial relationships. 
 
• The Power Plant Trainer: a standard desktop computer and partly a paper tiger. The over-
head panel is a paper tiger, but switches related to engine starts are real switches. The in-
strument panel is not displayed on the computer, instead, single critical instruments are 
displayed together with other essential a/c information and pedagogical information (e.g. 
diagram of the fuel flow/propeller pitch). 
 
• The Aircraft (A/C or a/c): the a/c is the aircraft cockpit. This is used for training the pre 
start checklist only. Trainees are not allowed to start the engines. The aircraft used was an 
A-type and there have also been some smaller equipment modifications between A-types. 
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Figure 1: The Saab 340 cockpit in the aircraft (a/c). The cockpit in the full flight simulator (FFS) is 
identical. Copyright: Saab Service Partner. 
 
 
 
• The Full Flight Simulator (FFS): the physical surroundings are identical to the aircraft 
cockpit. Trainees now know the pre start checklist (they have been checked out in the 
a/c), but they perform it as a normal part of the full flight simulation. The sample stops af-
ter the engines have been started, i.e. before there is any motion in the FFS. The full flight 
simulator at SAS Flight Academy is a Saab 340 B-type. 
 
• The Multi Aircraft Training Environment (MATE) Prototype: the size and shape of the 
physical cockpit mock-up, i.e. the spatial outline of the cockpit walls and roof, is stan-
dardised to a hybrid between medium sized commuter aircraft cockpits. The size of the 
two touch screens is large enough to implement a wide range of cockpit switches and in-
strumentation. The MATE prototype (located at the SAS Flight Academy in Sweden, Ar-
landa) was set up as a Saab 340 A-type with real throttles (controls). 
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Figure 2: the MATE set-up consisted of the cockpit mock-up, the projectors for back projection onto 
the semi transparent touch screens (overhead panel and instrument panel) and the instructor control 
station. It also included paper tiger parts (pedestal and side panels) and a demo object (oxygen mask).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: the MATE cockpit. Touch screens with back projected graphics: the overhead panel and the 
instrument panel. Real throttles were used in this prototype. Visuals are not a part of MATE because 
they are not required for procedural training. 
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Figure 4: detail from the touch screen with back projected computer graphics of the overhead panel. 
All switches (including spring loaded switches and switches with guards) and selectors can be moved 
(sometimes with a bit of difficulty) by using “one finger touch” instead of a grip (like in the real air-
craft). Sounds (e.g. a click from moving a switch) and lamps, including various aural and visual cau-
tions and alarms, are simulated together with the graphics. 
1.2 The Checklist Samples 
The checklist, including the pre start and engine start checklists, are divided into one normal 
and several abnormal procedures for operating the a/c, i.e. procedures for normal and for a 
range of abnormal conditions. The abnormal checklist describes what the pilot must do if cer-
tain symptoms of a/c malfunctions can be observed, e.g. “the hung start” (the engine gas tur-
bine has stopped accelerating) or “the hot start” (an over-temperature in the engine between 
the gas and the power turbine). The normal checklist consists of items (main headings) with 
keywords to be performed during normal operations. The extended checklist describes in de-
tail each point on the normal checklist (several sub headings). These descriptions must be 
learned by heart. The normal checklist, i.e. the short version with main headings, is the one 
that pilots use in line operation. The trainees had both checklists available. 
 
Instructors may sometimes have more practical ways of applying the normal checklist to line 
operations than actually described in the extended checklist. At the same time, trainees are 
required to follow the extended checklist. Thus, the trainees may sometimes experience con-
flicting opinions on how the checklist should be applied. Nevertheless, during this evaluation 
the written official Skyways extended checklist (Skyways version 960901, see appendix 11.1) 
was regarded as a description of the only correct procedural performance in the cockpit. This 
checklist is undergoing a constant review, but it is an official company document until it is 
officially changed. There is one instance however, where there was reason to believe that dif-
ferences between instructor practices and the extended checklist have had an impact on the 
trainee’s opportunities to learn a specific flow pattern (the avionics/inverters sequence in the 
pre start checklist). Errors related to this specific sequence are therefor disregarded. There are 
also other variations in the correct checklist procedure relevant to our samples. First, there is a 
difference between the Saab 340 A- and B-type. This has an implication on one point within 
our pre start sample (the auto coarsen system). Secondly, there is a difference in the pre start 
checklist dependent on the type of power source in use (battery start and bleed leak test, the 
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latter is not performed). The trainees are briefed in detail about these variations and these dif-
ferences should therefore not have any impact on the learning of the correct checklist proce-
dures. 
1.2.1 Pre Start 
The purpose of the pre start checklist is to prepare for the engine start and take off. Perform-
ance during this sample is individual and performed by the first officer (Right pilot / R). It is 
not required that the captain is present (Left pilot / L) and call outs are therefore not required. 
Both trainees in the crew were present in the a/c during training of the pre start checklist, but 
the checkout was performed individually with the instructor in the L seat, evaluating one 
trainee at the time. 
 
The task during the pre start checklist is static in nature; i.e. it is simply checking the cockpit 
configuration in relation to the (extended) checklist. The cockpit configuration is already 
close to the configuration described in the pre start checklist (the way the crew left it after the 
last flight of the day), so the number of configuration changes that the trainee must make is 
relatively low. Thus, in order to observe any errors, it was necessary to try to increase the po-
tential for errors. This was done by changing the default configuration before the trainee en-
tered the cockpit (the inserted error potential/pre start, appendix 11.2). 
 
In this evaluation we used two samples from the pre start checklist: (a) the training sample 
and (b) the checkout sample: 
 
 
a) Training sample: the range which this sample covers is touch screen specific, i.e. we only 
score performance in relation to the functionality represented on the MATE touch screen 
version of the overhead panel (items in appendix 11.1/the pre start part). The training 
sample is a part of the checklist that is (almost) identical between aircraft version A and 
B. In this sample, we do not collect data on performance in relation to items that are 
checked visually, because checking a specific item is not accompanied by actions that we 
can observe (e.g. eye movements). The training sample is recorded in pass 2 – 4. 
 
b) Checkout sample: this covers the complete pre start checklist. It includes the training 
sample and it has additional checklist items before and after the training sample, i.e. out-
side the camera angles and not relevant to the touch screen part of the MATE checklist 
(i.e. the operational definition of the Skyways checklist, appendix 11.1). The additional 
items (not included in the appendix) are related to (physically) checking the emergency 
and safety equipment (the minimum equipment list / MEL, the oxygen system). After the 
checkout, the instructor debriefs the trainee and makes notes (appendix 11.5) about what 
the trainee checked. This includes asking about what lamps were out of order and to what 
extent MEL items (the torch) were available and working. The checkout sample is re-
corded in pass 5 – 7. 
1.2.2 Engine Start 
The operational definition of an “engine start trial” (normal and abnormal) was: the attempt of 
one crew combination to start either the left or the right engine. Several start attempts (usually 
not more than two attempts) on one engine is part of the same engine start, provided that the 
failure to start the engine is due to the crew performance deviating from the checklist. If the 
failure to start an engine is due to the error potential inserted by the instructor (abnormal en-
gine starts; hung or hot start), or to the fact that the instructor commands a new start, then the 
second attempt to start that same engine is considered a new engine start. If there is a shut-
down for reasons other than the inserted error potential or instructor orders (i.e. it is not a new 
start), then the performance in the repetition of checklist items up to the point where this start 
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attempt failed is disregarded. A new engine start however, should always be performed (and 
therefore scored) from engine checklist item no. 1. (See the analysis chapter for details). 
 
The following describes the sample from the checklist related to engine starts only: 
 
 
Engine Start Sample 
 
From Start of Engines (engine checklist item no. 1, appendix 11.1/engine start sample) to Af-
ter Engine Start. The crew performs this sample together. It takes two persons to start the en-
gines in accordance with the checklist, i.e. the motoring start. The task is dynamic in that the 
crewmembers must co-operate, interpret various instruments and take actions on the basis of 
this information. Thus, an understanding of a/c subsystems and how they interact is necessary. 
Any malfunctions must be diagnosed and acted upon within seconds to avoid damage to the 
engines. 
 
 
Motoring 
 
Motoring is the name for ventilating (motoring) hot gasses/fuel away from the engine by en-
gaging the starter without supplying fuel or ignition. Motoring is done as part of a normal 
start procedure to be sure that there are no fuel gasses or high temperatures in the engines be-
fore the engines are started. Motoring is also done if the temperature between the two engine 
turbines approaches a critical value. These expensive turbines can be seriously damaged if the 
temperature (inter stage turbine temperature, ITT) is too high (960 degrees C or more). 
Motoring is performed by holding the spring-loaded starter switch in the L (left) or R (right) 
position, dependent on what engine the pilot will start. The condition lever must first be in 
fuel off and the relevant ignition switch must be off. (The ignition switch is guarded, so the 
guard must first be opened.) This will not only disable ignition, it will also disconnect the 
hold circuit that otherwise would continue to provide power to the starter. Thus, the pilot has 
direct control with the starter: it is engaged as long as he is holding the starter switch. It is 
therefore necessary to time the motoring sequence. During a normal start, the conditions 
described for engine temperature can be reached within a relatively short period of time. 
Thus, to save the starter and to save time (i.e. a new starter sequence can not be initiated 
within the next 3 minutes), the engines are started directly from motoring on the remaining 
part of the starter sequence (max 70 seconds): the captain orders “fuel on” and the first officer 
sets the condition lever to the start position and calls out “fuel is on”. Immediately after this 
(no later than 2 seconds), the captain enables the ignition and places his right hand on the 
condition lever (to be prepared for a shutdown if there are any abnormal signs, e.g. 
overheating between the turbines). 
2 Method 
2.1 Hypotheses 
Since the pre start checklist represents tasks that require very little feedback from the aircraft 
system, we do not expect that the experimental group should perform better than the control 
group, but at least that the experimental group is able to perform the checklist within the re-
quired limits. The Engine Start tasks require interpretation of system feedback and it is ex-
pected that trainees from the experimental group will have a benefit from training in an inte-
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grated and interactive environment, thus perhaps perform better than the control group on the-
se tasks. The experimental group should at least perform as well as the control group. 
 
The main hypothesis was that (a) the MATE trainees (the EXP group) would only initially 
perform the pre start checkout worse than the CTR group, i.e. in terms of time and/or errors, 
when transferred from MATE to the real environment and (b) that MATE trainees would per-
form engine starts better than the CTR group when the groups transferred to the real environ-
ment. 
2.2 Subjects and Instructors 
The subjects were 20 trainee pilots recruited by Skyways. Two subject groups, with 10 train-
ees in each group, were undergoing the Skyways training course on the Saab 340. It was not 
possible to influence how the groups were put together, since the courses at Skyways were set 
up before the planning of the evaluation. The first group (October-December, 1997) was the 
control group (CTR), i.e. conventional training. The second group (February-July, 1998) was 
the experimental group (EXP), i.e. MATE trainees (the MATE prototype was operational just 
in time for the second course). All trainees were promised full anonymity. All AV recordings 
will be treated with confidentiality and subsequently be erased. 
 
 
Background data for the control (CTR) and experimen-
tal (EXP) group 
 Age 
(years) 
Paper tiger 
(hours) 
Power plant*
(hours) 
Mulit-eng.
(hours) 
CTR 31.2  
(27-37) 
6.6  
(4.5-11) 
3.8  
(3-5) 
499  
(50-1100) 
EXP 35.5  
(29-52) 
8.6  
(3-13) 
3.6  
(2-8) 
525  
(0-1300) 
*Normal engine starts only 
 
Table 1: most trainees were in their early thirties, they had the same possibility for free play in the pa-
per tiger (training device), and approximately the same amount of training in the power plant trainer 
(desktop tool for training engine starts). Multi engine aircraft may be an indicator of previous experi-
ence with carrying out checklists (but it is not an indicator of total flight hours). 
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There were 7 instructors involved in this evaluation: two instructors during a/c training and 
the checkout, one instructor during MATE training and four instructors allocated to FFS tur-
nus instruction (the FFS was also used during the night). The instructors had different experi-
ence with Saab 340 courses: one a/c instructor was the chief instructor (responsible for the 
whole course) and the other a/c instructor was a captain trainee. The MATE instructor had 
just been checked out of technical training himself, and he was actually a trainee in the CTR 
group. One of the FFS instructors was also new in that position. 
2.3 Quasi Experimental Design 
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Figure 5: the quasi-experimental design. The main comparisons between the control group (n=10) and 
the experimental group (n=10) were made in the a/c checkout and in the first three passes of the FFS 
training. 
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Each pass contained all the 10 trainees, i.e. 5 crews in two combinations: both trainees should 
try both seat positions. One pass contained 10 sessions, each session representing one crew 
combination. Each trainee wrote down his unique crew letter on the back of his checklist, 
holding his letter in front of the video camera just before the session started. The instructor 
(was supposed to) state the pass and crew letter into the microphone, and also to write this 
(plus the date) on pre printed labels for the various videotapes and onto the score sheets (in-
structors were briefed, see also the what-to-do-list, appendix 11.4). During pre start, which is 
mainly done on an individual basis, this detailed labelling system (i.e. crew letters) was not 
strictly necessary, as it was always the R trainee that performed this checklist. During engine 
starts however, the trainees switch positions between sessions. The performance of individual 
trainees (as opposed to the crew) was not a major interest, but it was often difficult to know 
how far a particular trainee had come in the training (e.g. one trainee could be sick, i.e. train-
ees in a crew were not necessarily in the same crew throughout the course. Thus, this labelling 
system was of great help when analysing the data). One crew combination in one session 
could start an engine 2 times if it was a normal start (both L and R engine) or 3 times if it was 
an abnormal start (one extra attempt on one of the engines). These engine starts were labelled 
trials (see the definition of an engine start. It could be maximum 3 trials within 1 session). 
Thus, trial-labels were only used during engine starts. 
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A pass number represented the nth time of training the checklist sample. During technical 
training, the CTR group had 5 passes in the a/c. The first pass was a familiarisation pass, pass 
2-4 were the training passes, pass 5 was the checkout pass. The EXP group had the same 
number of passes in MATE, but with checkout pass number 5 in the a/c. The EXP group was 
guaranteed more checkout passes if needed, but the trainees were not told about this guarantee 
before their first checkout attempt. The EXP group needed two more a/c checkout passes, i.e. 
pass 6 and 7 (pass 7 with only two trainees). All trainees in the EXP group had one additional 
familiarisation pass in the a/c (pass 8).  In the FFS training, which combined the pre start and 
engine start samples, the CTR group had 6 passes and the EXP group had 7 passes. This last 
pass was due to new regulations (flying in bad weather/low visibility). Pre start was not em-
phasised by the instructors during FFS passes (at this point in time, all trainees were checked 
out from the technical training). Engine starts were emphasised in the 3 first FFS passes, but 
became less important at the end of the training (where flying the a/c was the main issue). The 
insertion of abnormalities during engine starts was done in pass 2 and 3  (dependent on train-
ing progress, as evaluated by the instructors). The MATE evaluation has focused on these first 
three passes to minimise training effects and to focus entirely on the pre start and engine start 
samples. Thus, there were three relevant passes in the full flight simulator (FFS), pass 1-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.1.1 PASS 
Figure 6: There was a total of 7 passes analysed for both the CTR group and the EXP group (and 3 
extra passes for the EXP group). One pass contained 10 sessions. Each session represented one crew 
combination performing one of the checklist samples once (pre start or engine start). A crew combina-
tion was identified from a two-letter code: the left letter position (i.e. role of the captain) represented 
the left seat and the right letter position (i.e. role of the first officer) represented the right seat (seen 
from the jump seat back in the cockpit). Trainees switched places between sessions. The control group 
had letters A-J, the EXP group had letters K-T. Each engine start session contained 2 trials if it was a 
normal start and 3 trials if it was an abnormal start. (Pre-start sessions did not contain trials.) Trials 
were labelled L (left) or R (right), start number 1 and start number 2. 
 
 
 
The CTR group followed a traditional Skyways Saab 340 course, consisting of classroom lec-
tures and training in paper tiger and power plant trainer (followed by FFS training). The CTR 
group had four training passes (familiarisation and pass 2-4) in the a/c and one checkout pass 
(pass 5). The EXP group had the course a couple of months later, with the same instructors 
(plus one new MATE instructor and one new FFS instructor) and at the same location at Ar-
landa in Sweden. The difference was that (1) the training in the a/c was replaced with the 
training in the MATE prototype and (2) the training of abnormal engine starts in the power 
plant trainer was replaced with training in the MATE prototype. Due to specific pedagogical 
tools (fuel diagrams) implemented in the power plant trainer, the EXP group had limited 
training of normal engine starts in the power plant trainer instead of in the MATE. The train-
ing of normal engine starts was performed with supervision from the instructor, i.e. the in-
structor demonstrated the power plant trainer. Both groups should have four passes with en-
gine start training, i.e. two normal and two abnormal passes. The EXP group had two passes 
with abnormal engine starts in MATE (in addition to the 4 pre start passes). The amount of 
training (in the a/c, the power plant trainer or the MATE)  was equal for both groups: a train-
ing pass in the a/c or in the MATE was fixed to 20 minutes. An engine start pass in the power 
plant trainer or in the MATE was fixed to 60 minutes. Both groups were free to use the paper 
tiger as much as they wanted. (They had access to this device also during the evenings.) 
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Performance on the pre start checklist was compared in the a/c without any cockpit familiari-
sation. This was the first time the EXP group saw the real Saab 340 cockpit. The comparison 
of engine starts (normal and abnormal) was done in the FFS. The performance was video re-
corded and the instructors were asked to complete the instructor score sheets (appendix 11.6). 
During the checkout, instructors also completed instructor notes, i.e. a specification of the 
types of errors and the time to complete the pre start checklist (appendix 11.5). When the 
checkout was completed, the trainees were said to have officially completed their technical 
training. This did not mean that the pre start checklist was disregarded during the next part of 
their training, but it was a requirement to have passed the technical training before being al-
lowed to operate the FFS. We continued to A/V record the pre start sample in the FFS. For the 
engine start sample (immediately after the pre start sample), we recorded an additional tape of 
the instrument panel and the area around the throttles (referred to with various degrees of ac-
curacy: controls / quadrant / throttles / pedestal). Thus, we had one video recording (with au-
dio) of the overhead panel and one video recording (with audio) of the instrument 
panel/pedestal in the FFS. In addition to this, both instructors and MATE trainees were asked 
questions (questionnaires, appendix 11.8) concerning the training in MATE (and background 
data). 
2.4 Procedures 
PASS DESCRIPTION ENVIRONMENT 
Pass 1 Familiarisation (not analysed) A/C or MATE 
Passes 2 - 4 Training (training samples) A/C or MATE 
 
Pre Start 
Passes 5 - 7 Checkout (checkout samples) A/C (comparison) 
Engine start Passes 2 - 4* Training normal and abnormal starts 
(not analysed) 
Power Plant Trainer 
or MATE 
   
Pre start & 
Engine start 
Passes 1 - 3 Combined passes. (Simulator train-
ing and Skyways rating.) 
FFS (comparison) 
Table 2: the aircraft (a/c) were accessed at Skyways’ terminal at Arlanda airport in Sweden (the park-
ing place or the hangar). The Multi Aircraft Training Environment (MATE) and the Saab 340 B full 
flight simulator (FFS) were accessed at the SAS Flight Academy, also located at Arlanda. 
 
*No recordings were made from the training in the power plant trainer. The MATE trainees had two 
passes (60 minutes each) with abnormal starts in the MATE, but these passes were not analysed due to 
resource problems and low priority. The main comparison was done with a/c checkout and  FFS data. 
 
 
The first passes in both the CTR group and the EXP group were familiarisation passes that 
were not analysed. The pass number refers to the nth time of training (MATE, a/c or FFS), i.e. 
there are 10 trainees forming 5 crews (crew combinations) performing 10 sessions (various 
number of trials) in each pass (in the FFS, Skyways refer to passes as sessions). The demands 
to speed and accuracy increases pass by pass, and so does the inserted error potential. Pass 1 
is a familiarisation pass for all personnel (including testing data recording) and trainees. 
 
 
Pre start 
Pass 1 was a familiarisation pass for all involved personnel (trainees, instructors, researcher, 
and equipment). Passes 2 – 4 were the training passes. Pass 5 was the first official checkout 
pass, passes 6-7 were two more checkout passes for the EXP group (if needed). 
 
Engine start 
Engines are not started for training purposes in the a/c. The FFS is used for this part of the 
training. There were 6 passes in the FFS for the CTR group. Due to new regulations, there 
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were 7 passes in the FFS for the EXP group. If the instructor thought that a trainee had 
reached an adequate level of performance on certain checklist items, these items were no 
longer stressed. Thus the relevance of the FFS training to this test decreased towards the end 
of the FFS passes. Also, the FFS passes were both training and tests, i.e. the instructor would 
help the trainee, but he would also set a mark on his performance. 
 
To maintain focus on the pre start and engine start, and to reduce learning effects from train-
ing in the FFS, we will focus on the three first FFS passes. These three FFS passes contain the 
pre start checklist. This will be recorded as a possible way of controlling how well instructors 
are able to predict performance of the trainees. The interesting part in the FFS is the engine 
start, following directly after the pre start. The engines are started as a crew and each individ-
ual crewmember must try both roles in the crew (i.e. the captain and the first officer). Train-
ees change seat positions between sessions. However, due to the expensive simulator time and 
variations in performance, this set-up may be changed unsystematically by the FFS instructor. 
The most interesting figures will therefore be the total number of errors (based on perform-
ance deviations from the checklist) observed in each pass. 
2.5 Apparatus 
Skyways use real aircraft for training of the pre start checklist. Studying performance of train-
ees in the real cockpit turned out to be a practical challenge. Whenever a Saab 340 is tempo-
rarily parked at Arlanda (for maintenance and preparations between flights), it is used for 
training. Sometimes training in the cockpit and maintenance were in conflict, thus resulting in 
a delay (or cancellation) of training. This means that instructors and trainees have to be stand 
by at the airport (or close) for longer periods of time. Thus, the researcher must have mobile 
equipment that can be mounted without any permanent arrangements and adjusted very fast. 
We have used a portable monitor with a wire extension. This is important, because the re-
searcher can then monitor recording from the cabin instead of the cockpit. We have used two 
12V power packs (batteries), a standard video camera with batteries. (Several backup batter-
ies). We had to have a lot of backup power. There is no DC 220V available in the ground 
power unit (and we did not know if the a/c was parked at the gate/parking place or in the han-
gar). 
 
One SVHS-C camera on a removable bracket was used to video and audio record the per-
formance on the overhead panel in the a/c and in the MATE. Due to practical limitations the 
camera had to be placed on the floor, close to the pedestal, and record the panel in a landscape 
format (i.e. tilted). One digital camera (DVD) was used to record performance on the over-
head panel in the FFS. The digital camera was small enough to be mounted on the wall be-
tween the R pilot and the instructor seat. The small LCD monitor on the camera could be ad-
justed so that the instructor was able to monitor the recording. The perspective was the same 
as used in the a/c and in the MATE. The same type of camera was used in the MATE, 
mounted in the roof of the cockpit mock-up, to record the pedestal (and parts of the instru-
ment panel). An ordinary VHS black and white camera, mounted in the roof above the in-
structor, was used to record the pedestal in the FFS. 
 
 
Video and Audio Analyses Techniques 
 
The various video formats (DVD, SVHS-C, SVHS and VHS) were copied for backup onto 
ordinary SVHS and VHS tapes. Copies of the backup tapes were also made and sent to a part-
ner in the MATE project, the Defence and Evaluation Research Agency (DERA) in the UK, 
for independent descriptive scoring of the same data set. A descriptive score sheet was first 
developed in collaboration with DERA. The score sheets contained the operational definitions 
of the Skyways extended checklist (appendix 11.1). 
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The objective pre start data consisted of one video recording of performance on the overhead 
panel per trainee. The objective engine start data consisted of two simultaneous video re-
cordings of the performance, one for the overhead panel and one for the instrument panel / 
pedestal, per crew combination. Synchronisation of engine start tapes was not necessary, 
since actions could easily be followed between videos and the researcher could only attend to 
one videotape at the time. Thus each tape was viewed separately for the purpose of scoring, 
although the descriptions were merged into one descriptive score sheet. One descriptive score 
sheet was completed for each trainee in the pre start part (a/c and MATE) and one for each 
crew combination in the pre start + engine start part (FFS). A SVHS / VHS video machine 
with shuttle control was used for playback of the backup tapes to be analysed. Describing the 
raw data from video was done close to real playback time (for each video). Two monitors, one 
28’’ (including digital still-picture, some details had to be enlarged) and one 14’’ were used. 
Descriptions were made regarding every deviation from the operational definition of the ex-
tended checklist (appendix 11.1). 
 
Sound was recorded on all videotapes, i.e. two sound recordings from the FFS. Due to the 
location of microphones, the sound quality varied between the recordings, but an adequate 
audio playback was produced. However, the sound was sometimes heavily disturbed by a/c 
systems (e.g. the a/c hydraulic system, interference from electrical systems in the FFS dis-
turbed some of the EXP recordings). An equaliser was therefore used to filter specific fre-
quencies. Both the complete set of checklists (normal, extended and abnormal) and a detailed 
enlarged picture of the overhead panel were available to the analysts at all times. The picture 
was often compared with the video recording, since lighting conditions on recordings varied. 
It was sometimes difficult to decide about the position of a specific switch by looking at the 
video picture only. Attention was given to audio and video recordings simultaneously, to ac-
tually hear the click when a switch was moved (the MATE also simulated sound). 
3 Analysis 
The MATE (the MATE trainer prototype was the independent variable) was evaluated against 
the conventional training environments: the a/c and the power plant trainer: 
 
Three analysts have been involved in the data analyses, two from Risø and one from DERA. 
All three analysts spent time (approximately 5 days) learning the checklist and understanding 
some basic features of the a/c system interactions. There was complete agreement between 
DERA and Risø on the raw descriptive scoring of data from video, i.e. the actions deviating 
from the actions described in the operational definition of the extended checklist. The catego-
risation of raw descriptions into errors was discussed between DERA (UK, Farnborough), 
Risø (DK), and Saab 340 instructors at Skyways and at the SAS Flight Academy (SE). There 
has not been any independent error categorisation and therefore no test of inter-scorer reliabil-
ity (the project was delayed and the categorisation system was not completed). 
 
A distinction was made between objective data and subjective data: the objective data were 
based on recordings of subjects’ behaviour and subject/system interaction, i.e. the raw data 
can be considered to be relatively free of judgements. The objective performance data from 
all three conditions (a/c, MATE, FFS) were first described in relation to the extended check-
list. These descriptions were categorised into errors so that the two groups could be compared 
statistically. The subjective data were the instructors’ ratings of trainees’ performance and the 
instructors’ and trainees’ opinions of training in the MATE. 
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Overview of Data: 
 
• Audio/Video recordings (training sample passes 2-4, checkout sample passes 5-7) and 
instructor notes (pass 5) from the pre start checkout and the checkout debriefs: errors re-
lated to checklist actions/checking various items, callouts, time to complete the checkout 
and role in the crew. 
 
• Skyways’ evaluation of the completed pre start checkout (approved/not approved). 
 
• Audio-tape from the additional familiarisation pass (pass number 8). 
 
• Instructor score sheets (their subjective impressions of both CTR and EXP). 
 
• Instructor opinions of MATE as a training device 
 
• Trainees’ opinions of training in MATE. 
 
 
Objective and Subjective Data: 
 
When the raw data is in a form that can be said to be free of interpretation, we refer to it as 
objective (e.g. from the A/V recordings). When the data represents an impression/opinion of 
some sort, we refer to it as subjective (e.g. Instructor score sheets). The objective data is cate-
gorised into various types of erroneous performance in terms of time and errors. The follow-
ing describes the analysis from the description of raw data to the error categorisation: 
3.1 Description of Data 
Observable crew performance deviating from the performance described in the Skyways Saab 
340A extended checklist (version 960901, appendix 11.1) were described action by action. 
These descriptions of deviations were later categorised into errors. The Saab 340 instructors 
were consulted when deciding what type of deviations should be considered erroneous. 
 
 
Observable System Variables 
 
There were no system logs available in any of the training environments (no log facilities 
were implemented in the MATE prototype). The relevant system variables were therefore 
logged by means of A/V recordings (appendix 11.1/Engine Start Sample) of instruments, 
lamps and alarms (aural cautions and warnings). In addition, the instructor wrote down task 
specific variables (the inserted error potential and the type of starts). 
 
Observable Crew Variables 
 
During the pre start sample, individual assessments were made of switch actions on the over-
head panel and the total time to complete the pre start checkout. The remaining variables ap-
ply to the engine start part of the checklist. The crew (i.e. two trainees) performed the engine 
start checklist.  
 
Actions on Checklist Items: 
All the actions that deviated from the extended checklist were described. The descriptions will 
be kept as a long-term record (the videos will be erased). Chunks of actions in the extended 
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checklist were broken down into single observable actions and related to each observable 
change in the configuration of a panel. Actions that deviated from the checklist descriptions 
within a main checklist heading were described in relation to the end result of those actions, 
i.e. position changes, rather than other aspects of how these actions were carried out, or in 
what sequence. However, mismatches between the checklist sequence of main headings and 
the observed sequence of main headings were described. 
 
Actions fall into two main categories: non-verbal actions and verbal actions. Non verbal ac-
tions were (hand / finger) movements related to the cockpit configuration of various switches, 
including guarded and safe tied switches and handles (for securing switch and handle posi-
tions), selectors (e.g. the voltage selector) and controls (i.e. the throttles). It also included 
finding and reading an abnormal checklist, and giving the disconnect sign. Some actions did 
not leave any observable result in the interface (i.e. change of positions): spring loaded 
switches, like the test switches and the engine start switch, will always have a centre position. 
The result of actions on these switches was observed in relation to direct system consequences 
of these actions. Mandatory verbal actions were the uttered callouts and commands. The call-
outs, i.e. the standardised verbal statements, are mandatory formal ways of communicating 
about the a/c system status at critical points during the execution of the checklist. A callout is 
usually a request or a positive feedback on a request. There were no formal callouts at Sky-
ways that trainees were obliged to use if the system premises for a callout were untrue. Com-
mands (i.e. direct orders) were included in the callout term (because it was only one actual 
command in the engine start sample). 
 
Finally, there were many actions related to visual observations to ensure that the checklist 
items were in order. Visual activity was not measured, but the instructor made notes during 
the a/c pre start checkout concerning the checking of lamps (malfunctioning of light bulbs). 
The instructor also made notes concerning the checking of the minimum equipment list, MEL 
(e.g. that the torch was there and that it was working). The notes were confirmed by asking 
the trainee about the system status at various points in time during the checkout. This took 
place during the debrief in the cockpit, immediately after the checkout. 
 
Time to Complete the Crew Actions: 
Time was (a) a separate measure of performance during the complete pre start checkout (in 
relation to the official Skyways minimum requirement of 15 minutes). Time was also (b) 
measured to evaluate the correctness of specific actions (complying with time limits) during 
engine starts. The latter (b) will be referred to as timing. 
 
Role of the Crewmember 
The seat position determines the role as a crewmember: the L (left) seat represents the role of 
the captain and the R (right) seat represents the role of the first officer. The checklist deter-
mines which crewmember should perform what actions. The conformity to these requirements 
was observed. The seat position of the trainee performing the action was scored if their role in 
the crew was reversed, i.e. R pilot performing checklist items that the L pilot should have per-
formed and the other way around. 
3.2 Categorisation of Erroneous Performance 
There were two types of objective performance measures: (1) time to complete the pre start 
checklist during the checkout and (2) number of checklist errors (type and mode). 
 
Time for completing the pre start checkout (1): 
 
Using more than 15 minutes to complete the pre start checklist does not have any direct a/c 
system consequences, but could potentially cause inconvenience because the scheduled depar-
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ture could perhaps be delayed if the crew spent too much time on completing the pre start 
checklist. The definition of a 15 minutes limit is a company requirement that may vary be-
tween airlines (the limit for passing the same technical training in SAS is 20 minutes). Ex-
ceeding these 15 minutes can therefore not be considered a checklist error. This measure of 
time is a separate indication of the quality of the performance in relation to Skyways stan-
dards. As such, this time limit is less important than the checklist errors. 
 
Checklist Errors (2): 
 
The operational definition of the checklist describes verbal actions (related to callouts, includ-
ing commands) and non-verbal actions (related to the cockpit configuration of switches etc.) 
in relation to: a/c system status, time limits and the role of the crewmember. 
 
The concept of error was related to the operational definition of the checklist, the observed 
a/c system status, the observed timing, the observed role and the inserted error potential (and 
instructor commands). The inserted error potential (see appendix 11.2) describes the a/c sys-
tem variables that have been manipulated during the evaluation, i.e. it constitutes a potential 
for errors. This potential was pre defined, i.e. the specific cockpit configuration deviating 
from the default was decided before the evaluation (it was an attempt to make the various 
training tasks more difficult, but the instructors did not always comply with this set-up). Ac-
tions deviating from the correct application of the checklist will be erroneous and each ob-
servable deviation will count as one error. If some consequential actions can be regarded as 
subjectively correct due to a misinterpretation of the system status, they are still objectively 
wrong, e.g. handling an erroneous shutdown correctly is still erroneous. 
 
Data was not recorded for interpreting any cognitive aspects of errors, e.g. discriminating be-
tween perception (e.g. seen/not seen) and higher cognitive processes (e.g. inten-
tion/understanding/knowledge/diagnosis). Observations were made exclusively of the results 
of behaviour, i.e. if the observed actions deviating from the correct cockpit configuration, 
callouts or the role of the crewmember. Also, the categorisation of errors was not related to 
specific types of switches. (Only the descriptive scoring was related to specific single check-
list actions, appendix 11.1.) Each erroneous action was counted as one error. Potential conse-
quences, i.e. new checklist actions and error potentials, of trainee induced errors were disre-
garded. However, sometimes it was difficult to know if the start was objectively defined (i.e. 
not trainee induced) as normal or abnormal, due to the incomplete instructor score sheets. 
When this was the case, assumptions have been made based on conversations between in-
structors and trainees to determine if it was an abnormal start (objectively defined) or if the 
trainees just thought so. 
 
The categorisation system used for classifying and counting observed behaviour as erroneous 
(see e.g. Rasmussen, J., 1982, Reason, 1990) had two dimensions: specific error types and 
general error modes (detailed explanation below). The words type and mode are both used as 
names for an error category, but these two dimensions represent different levels of abstrac-
tion. The main rule for counting was one error type and one error mode per action deviating 
from the operational definition of the checklist (score sheet, appendix 11.1). 
 
The three error types were (a) cockpit configuration errors (config. errors), i.e. the position of 
switches and controls in relation to the checklist and the system status, (b) callout errors, i.e. 
erroneous phraseology or a mismatch with the system status and (c) role errors, i.e. related to 
whom was performing the action. These error types can also be described in functional terms, 
i.e. the three general error modes: (a) sequence of actions (flow), (b) missing actions (omis-
sions) and (c) wrong actions (commission). The following section will first describe error 
types and then describe error modes. (See table below.) 
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1. The three types of errors: domain specific terminology was used to name the specific er-
ror types (configuration and callout). The role category (grey area) is an additional cate-
gory not related to the immediate consequences on the a/c system status. 
 
2. The three general error modes: these were used for describing the formal characteristics 
of the error types. The flow error mode has timing as a sub category. The omission error 
mode has transition as a sub category. Note that role (grey area) is not classified in any of 
the modes. Also note that one erroneous callout can be counted in two error modes (two 
grey cells). 
 
 
 
 ERROR TYPES 
 
 
ERROR MODES 
Config. errors 
Switches/controls in rela-
tion to the checklist 
and the system status. 
Callout errors   
Orders/callouts phraseol-
ogy in relation to the 
checklist and the sys-
tem status. 
Role errors 
Reversal of whom is per-
forming the checklist 
actions. 
Flow       
Flow (timing)    Grey means AND, i.e. 
Omission    additional  error. 
Omission (transition)    
Commission    
 
Total    
 
Table 3: Categorisation of performance from the score sheets (i.e. the operational definition of the 
checklist, appendix 11.1). The error categorisation system has two dimensions: (1) three domain spe-
cific error types and (2) three general error modes. (Appendix 11.3) 
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The following section will elaborate on the error types and modes. 
 
 
Error types 
 
Non verbal actions were referred to as (domain specific) configuration errors. Configuration 
errors are any results of actions on cockpit switches and throttles/controls deviating from the 
actions (results) described in the extended checklist. 
 
Verbal actions were referred to as (domain specific) callout errors. One question pertinent to 
the scoring of callout errors was whether or not a callout should be interpreted as correct if the 
meaning reference was judged as clear enough, or should the strict form of the checklist call-
out be used as the only acceptable callout, i.e. without any interpretation? The latter option 
was regarded as the most adequate for scoring and also preferable because one of the main 
purposes of the checklist is to formalise communication (to increase safety/reliability). How-
ever, problems with the sound made it difficult to discriminate between smaller phonetic de-
tails (due to hydraulic noise and electrical interference) and language problems (trainees’ 
command of English/translation problems for the researchers; cockpit communication in 
Swedish). 
 
Callouts were not analysed on a higher resolution than the level of propositions. Thus, each 
callout statement was one unit of analysis. If a callout came in the wrong place within the 
sample, it was one flow error. If it did not come at all within the sample, it was an error of 
omission. A common deviation was that something was missing from the complete callout as 
defined in the checklist. Seen in isolation, this may constitute an error of omission. However, 
here the proposition (call out) is seen as one action and it is wrong in relation to the a/c sys-
tem, hence an error of commission. 
 
The callout meaning reference can constitute an error of commission in two different ways: 
 
1) The phraseology can be wrong (semantics, syntax), i.e. it is deviating from the checklist 
phraseology. The meaning reference can be misunderstood because the callout phraseol-
ogy has changed. 
 
2) The meaning reference of the phrase can be wrong because the system status does not 
match this reference; i.e. the premises for the callout have not been met. Thus the correct 
performance would be the absence of a call out (i.e. checked means that something is OK) 
and start investigating the a/c system malfunction. 
 
Distinctions were not made between these two aspects of incorrect meaning references when 
counting callout errors. There was one callout error of commission if at least one of the fol-
lowing criteria were met: (1) if the analyst found any deviation from the exact checklist 
phrase. Practically, this was a scoring of morphemes (meaningful part / the stem of a word), 
and (2) if the system conditions that the callout was referring to were untrue. Practically, this 
scoring was limited by our ability to observe the system status. (The system variables ob-
served were marked on the descriptive engine start score sheets, appendix 11.1) 
 
Callouts (including commands) are positively defined as something that must be said, given 
that there is correspondence between the system status and the correct callout phrase. There is 
no formal callout for the instances when there is a mismatch, i.e. the system status is different 
from the premises that must be met before the callout can be executed. This means that train-
ees are free to report abnormalities anyway they like (including an altered version of the cor-
rect callout), but they should not execute the correct callout phrase (in the checklist) if the 
premises are not met. Further more, the checklist does not forbid verbal behaviour that is not 
defined as a formal callout: during the pre start checklist, trainees’ often callout the checklist 
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items. However, there is no requirement to do so (the R pilot could actually be alone in the 
cockpit at this point in time), but some pilots may find it helpful to memorise the checklist by 
verbalising certain items. Thus, repetitions of callouts, various callout-like statements and 
general small talk are therefore not categorised as errors in this analysis. Everything that is 
said outside a callout is irrelevant, except if an additional statement refers directly to a callout 
and changes the meaning reference so that the callout becomes ambiguous. For example, if 
the call out was “starting right” and this callout was repeated later, this is not erroneous as 
long as the right engine was started. If the repetition of the call out (and callout-like state-
ments) was incorrect, e.g. “starting left”, then this repetition makes the meaning reference of 
the first callout ambiguous, hence an error of commission. 
 
 
Role errors 
 
Role errors relate to actions that are correct when seen in isolation, but performed by the 
wrong crewmember. There is a role reversal error when the crewmembers perform the check-
list items of each other. This type of error can be continuos; only one error for each role re-
versal between the two trainees was scored. Role reversal is not directly related to a/c system 
consequences and it was scored independently of the other error types (configuration and 
callout) and the error modes. 
 
 
General Error Modes 
 
The word mode only implies that the error category is more general than the domain specific 
type of error. The domain specific errors related to cockpit configuration (non-verbal, includ-
ing checking onboard equipment) and callout (verbal, including commands) can be placed in 
either of these modes: 
 
• Omission: not doing something that should have been done 
• Commission: doing something that should not have been done 
• Flow: doing something correctly, in the wrong sequence/at the wrong time. 
 
 
Omission and Commission 
An erroneous action can in some cases be classified both as the presence of the wrong action 
and the absence of the correct action. However, these are two perspectives on the same error 
and not two independent errors. Omission is the total absence of an action related to the a/c 
system (within the sample). Commission is the presence of a wrong action related to the a/c 
system (within the sample). The presence of an action excludes the possibility of omission for 
that same action, regardless of how many sub systems that one action is referring to. An im-
portant aspect is to be able to isolate errors when an action was there, but something was 
wrong with the action, and when the action was not there at all. 
 
When parts of a main system are controlled by separate switches, then each switch action can 
constitute one error; e.g. if both L and R switch should be off, then not switching off L side is 
one error of omission and switching R side on is one error of commission. No speculation is 
made regarding cognitive aspects like the trainees’ understanding of a/c systems, e.g. if the 
switches should be on or off / i.e. would be only one error related to knowledge. 
 
If each sub system (part of a main system) is controlled by one action, the actions will be 
scored independently. If one switch controls two identical systems (L and R side), then con-
necting the wrong system and not connecting the correct system by the same action is one 
error: e.g. starting R engine when the callout was L engine is counted as one error. There is 
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one commission error for each action deviating from the correct action. Omission error can 
only be assigned to actions that should have been in the sample, one for each missing action. 
Thus, omission and commission are mutually exclusive for the same action. 
 
 
Omission transition: 
Generally, the current engine start must be completed before initiating a new engine start. If a 
new engine start is initiated without completing the current (i.e. previous), then omission er-
rors will be scored for checklist items that were not completed. Attempts to complete the pre-
vious checklist items during the new engine start will not be scored as errors of commission in 
the new start. Such actions will be disregarded in the new engine start. This is the main rule 
and omission errors scored due to this transition will be counted as any other error of omis-
sion. An exception from this had to be made for transitions between objectively defined (a 
priori/instructor) abnormal starts and the next start trial. 
 
A chunk of omission errors that relate to abnormal starts were separated from the other omis-
sions because it was suspected that this could represent a systematic error. Often the trainee 
continued directly from motoring due to an abnormal start (without completing the abnormal 
checklist) to a standard motoring start in a new engine start trial (e.g. calling out “timing” in-
stead of starting at the first checklist item). This is one error of omission for each checklist 
item that has not been performed in both start trails (it is also a violation of the 70 seconds 
starter sequence limit and the required 3 minutes delay between starts). There are time limits 
both for motoring due to an abnormal start (minimum 10 seconds) and for the motoring start 
(maximum 30 seconds), but it is not possible (at least not reliable) to divide the total time the 
trainee is holding the starter switch between the two start trials. Therefore timing will be dis-
regarded in these instances. During these transitions between engine starts, one configuration 
error will be registered for not letting go of the starter switch, one configuration error for not 
reading the abnormal checklist (two such errors if it is a hung start, because then it is also re-
quired to check the voltage) and finally four call out errors for not performing the first four 
callouts prior to motoring start. These errors will all be in the omission transition mode. 
 
Note that these transitions are different from an erroneous shutdown due to the trainees’ 
wrong interpretation of the system status: omitting to complete the last part and the first part 
of the checklist during transitions between starts are counted as one error for each missing 
action (omission transition between engine starts), whereas an erroneous shutdown induced 
by the trainee (with consequential new actions and error potentials) is counted as one error 
only (because it is by definition the same engine start, see paragraph 2.2.2). 
 
 
Flow 
A flow error mode is different from omission error mode in that it is a correct action, but it is 
in a wrong place (in the checklist)/at the wrong time/outside a defined time window, and still 
within the sample. There is one flow error for each checklist main heading performed in the 
wrong place. Thus, within a main heading it was only the end result that was scored, except 
for checking voltage before connecting a power source. Flow errors can be counted in several 
ways; taking into account e.g.: the size of the jump/number of main headings, if the actions 
are part of a chunk/several sub-headings, how the various actions are combined/checklist po-
sition number etc. In this evaluation it was decided to give one flow error per backward jump 
in the checklist. This operational definition may not describe all instances of flow errors cor-
rectly, but it made an otherwise very complicated scoring easier and therefore more reliable. 
Each time the trainee went backwards in the checklist to perform an action that should have 
been performed earlier (i.e. he jumped forward in the checklist at that time), it was counted as 
one flow error. This was regardless of the size of the jump or any other complicating factor. 
When two main-heading actions directly following each other switched places, the flow error 
mode was assigned the first of those actions, i.e. highest up in the checklist. 
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Flow-timing; during engine starts 
Not complying with critical minimum and maximum time limits is erroneous and should im-
mediately induce a set of corrective actions. The actions that must be timed are correct seen in 
isolation, but exceeding an absolute time limit (e.g. maximum 2 seconds between condition 
lever to start and ignition) may affect the a/c system (it could damage the engine). The correct 
action has been completed outside the given time window, i.e. at a time (place in the check-
list) when the specific action was wrong. This was counted as one error per violated time 
limit.  
 
Counting the Errors 
All errors were considered to be of equal importance when errors were counted in this evalua-
tion. This is because a serious aspect of these errors, i.e. a threat to sufficient safety, is the 
deviation from the checklist itself: the checklist is the main tool for guaranteeing a reliable 
and safe cockpit configuration at all times. The main principle for error categorisation is 
therefore to assign one error for each observed deviation from the extended checklist. This 
principle also applies to errors that are continuous (role reversal), errors that have a new set of 
actions and error potentials as a consequence (erroneous shutdown) and erroneous single ac-
tions that have more than one reference to the a/c system (left and right sides of the systems). 
However, when one system has several subsystems and each sub system requires one action, 
then each switch action is scored individually. 
 
The main principle for counting errors was that there could only be one error type and one 
error mode per action. However, there were two exceptions: 1) role error was scored inde-
pendently of the errors related to the a/c systems. Thus, it was possible to have [one configu-
ration error OR one callout error] AND [one role error] for the same action. 2) a callout was 
erroneous if the checklist position of the callout was incorrect, i.e. one flow error mode AND 
if the meaning reference was incorrect, i.e. one commission error mode (due to phraseology 
and/or untrue a/c system conditions). Thus it was possible to have both a flow- and a commis-
sion error mode for the same callout. 
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Overview of the Objective Performance Measures: 
 
See the error categorisation score sheet, appendix 11.3 
 
Time: 
Maximum 15 minutes to complete the formal a/c pre start checkout.  
 
Error Types: 
1. Configuration errors: positions of switches and throttles/controls in relation to the check-
list and the system status. 
2. Callout errors: phraseology in relation to the checklist and the system status. 
3. Role errors: action performed by the wrong crewmember. 
 
Error Modes (for configuration and call out errors): 
1. Flow: too early or too late in the sequence – timing is not a critical factor. 
2. Flow-timing: a critical procedural time limit is violated, i.e. the action lies outside the 
given time window. 
3. Omission: the action is not in the sample. 
4. Omission-transition: chunks of omissions (abnormal starts/motoring) 
4. Commission: there is an action, but it is wrong (incomplete/inaccurate) in relation to the 
checklist and the system status. 
4 Result 
4.1 Pre Start Checkout in the Aircraft 
The formal pre start checkout took place in the aircraft (a/c) cockpit and it ended the technical 
training (i.e. pre start training conducted before starting the FFS training). This checkout was 
the fifth time in the a/c for the CTR group (pass 5) and the first time in the a/c for the EXP 
group (their fifth pre start pass, i.e. pass 5). The Skyways chief instructor must officially ap-
prove the performance before the trainees are allowed to continue the Saab 340 training in the 
FFS. The checkout was approved by Skyways if the number of errors was sufficiently low, as 
judged subjectively by the instructors, and if the total time on the complete pre start checklist 
(the checkout sample) did not exceed 15 minutes. 
4.1.1 Objective Performance Measures 
• THE CONTROL GROUP: All 10 trainees in the CTR group passed (approved by Sky-
ways instructors) the formal checkout in their first attempt, i.e. in pass number 5 (the first 
checkout pass). The mean number of errors was 2.5 errors and the mean time to complete 
the checklist was 11.7 minutes. 
 
• THE EXPERIMENTAL GROUP: Two trainees in the EXP group passed the checkout in 
their first attempt, i.e. in pass number 5. This was without familiarisation with the cock-
pit; i.e. it was the first time the EXP group saw a real Saab 340 cockpit. (The EXP group 
was also denied travelling in the cockpit jump seat when on leave). Six trainees out of the 
remaining 8 trainees passed the checkout in their second attempt (pass 6) and the 2 re-
maining trainees passed in their third attempt (pass 7). This final formal pass was not used 
for comparison (too few trainees. The mean number of errors in pass 7 was 1.5 errors and 
their mean time to complete the checkout was 11 minutes). 
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• ADDITIONAL FAMILIARISATION PASS (8): After pass 7, the instructors decided (the 
3 instructors agreed) that all 10 EXP trainees would have to participate in one additional 
pre start checklist familiarisation pass (pass 8), before they could be allowed to train in 
the FFS. The purpose was to make the trainees more secure on the items they performed 
less well and generally to enable a faster completion of the pre start checklist. The train-
ing was recorded on audio tape and the items that, according to the instructors, required 
additional attention in the familiarisation pass were: 
 
1) A repetition of the pre start checklist items, mostly the practical performance rather than 
the theory. 
 
2) An emphasis on how to move switches and controls in a correct way. This is not de-
scribed in the checklist. There is actually no formal objectively defined wrong way of 
moving switches (except for the battery switch that must not be placed in override). 
 
3) Items not trained by using the MATE touch screen, i.e. thought verbally and by the help 
of demo object/pictures/paper tiger parts of MATE (such as e.g. MEL/the torch, the oxy-
gen mask, trim settings). 
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The additional pass was also used to catch up with items not trained in MATE at all, e.g. the 
hands on training (a separate type of training that deals with other onboard systems, like e.g. 
the manual hydraulic pump). This training had to be delayed in order to avoid cockpit familia-
risation before the a/c pre start checkout (pass 5) for the EXP group (as we measured the 
transfer effects from a real to a virtual environment.) 
 
The following sections will examine errors and time during the pre start checklist. The non-
parametric Mann-Whitney Test was used (.05 convention). 
 
 
Differences in the total number of errors 
 
The figure below shows the comparison of errors: 
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Figure 7: The number of errors (all error categories) observed during the pre start checkout in the a/c. 
The control group (CTR  5) was compared with the experimental group the first (EXP5) and the second 
(EXP 6) time the experimental group performed the checkout. (EXP 7 contained two trainees only). 
There were no significant differences in the mean number of errors for any of these comparisons. 
 
 
1. There was no significant difference with respect to the mean number of errors observed in 
the CTR group checkout (pass 5) and the EXP group checkout (pass 5). This comparison 
was made with the inserted error potential and for the whole checkout sample, i.e. includ-
ing checklist items that were not relevant to the touch screen technology in MATE (the 
training environment prototype included more training facilities than just the two touch 
screens, e.g. paper tiger parts and demo objects). The mean number of errors for the CTR 
group was 2.5 errors. The mean number of errors for the EXP group was 2.7 errors. 
 
2. There was no significant difference with respect to the mean number of errors observed in 
the CTR group (pass 5) and the second checkout for the EXP group (pass 6). This com-
parison was made with the inserted error potential and for the whole checkout sample, i.e. 
including checklist items that were not relevant to the touch screen technology in MATE. 
The mean number of errors for the CTR group (pass 5) was 2.5 errors. The mean number 
of errors for the EXP group in pass 6 was 2.25 errors. 
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Differences in the time used to complete the checklist 
 
 
The figure below shows the comparison of the time to complete the pre start checklist: 
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Figure 8: The mean time (in minutes) trainees used to complete the pre start checkout in the a/c. The 
control group (CTR 5) was compared with the experimental group the first (EXP 5) and the second 
(EXP 6) time the experimental group performed the checkout. (EXP 7 contains two trainees only). The 
experimental group (MATE trainees) used significantly longer time both the first and the second time 
in the a/c. 
 
 
 
3. The EXP group used significantly longer time than the CTR group in their first checkout 
attempt (p < 0.001). The control group mean time was 11.7 minutes to complete the 
checkout (pass 5). In the first attempt (pass 5), the EXP group mean time to complete the 
checklist was 16.1 minutes. No trainee used more than 20 minutes. 
 
4. In the second attempt for the EXP group (pass 6), the mean time to complete the checkout 
was14 minutes. All EXP trainees used less than 15 minutes (the official limit for ap-
proval), but still significantly (p = 0.001) longer mean time than the CTR group in the 
checkout pass 5 (11.7 minutes). 
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Differences in errors and time for parts of the checkout sample 
 
The main result for errors and time for the pre start checkout sample was that the groups did 
not differ with respect to the amount of errors, but the EXP group was significantly slower to 
perform the checkout than the CTR group. An explanation for this could be that the trainees 
used more time on checklist items that were not simulated by using the touch screen technol-
ogy in MATE, i.e. items that were mentally rehearsed. Items outside the training sample were 
explained verbally to the trainees, e.g. items on MEL (minimum equipment list). Checklist 
items on other cockpit panels were explained by the help of the paper tiger parts of MATE 
(pedestal and side panels). Finally, a real oxygen mask was shown (but not demonstrated). 
Thus, it could be that the extra time was spent on these items, and not on the items that were 
trained by using the touch screen. The graphical representations of switches etc. look quite 
similar to the real switches. Perhaps trainees would be unaffected by the change of environ-
ment to a real cockpit for this particular part of the sample, but slower on all the more theo-
retical items?  
 
To test this hypothesis, the (complete) checkout sample was divided into the training part of 
the sample, which is relevant to the touch screen technology only, and the remaining part of 
the checklist sample (i.e. the whole checkout sample minus the training part of the checkout 
sample). The number of errors in each sample was counted, including the error potential. Out-
side the training sample, the presence of batteries in flashlights was used as error potential 
(Emergency and safety equipment, MEL). There was no video recording of the sample out-
side the training sample, but the instructors made notes including the trainees’ total time for 
completing the checklist. The time spent on each part of the sample was measured for all trai-
nees. A between comparison was made for the mean number of errors and the mean time per 
part of the sample: 
 
1. There were no significant differences between the two groups with respect to the mean 
number of errors in the training sample during the checkout, neither in the first (pass 5) 
nor in the second (pass 6) checkout attempt of the experimental group. 
 
2. There were no significant differences between the two groups with respect to the mean 
number of errors observed in the remaining part of the checkout sample, i.e. the part out-
side the touch screen relevant items, in neither of the two checkout attempts. 
 
3. There were significant differences between the two groups with respect to the time used 
to complete the training sample during the first checkout (pass 5): the EXP group used 
significantly (p = 0.001) longer time than the CTR group on this touch screen part of the 
checkout sample. 
 
4. There was a significant difference between the two groups with respect to the mean time 
used to complete the training sample during the second checkout pass (pass 6). The EXP 
group still used significantly (p = 0.033) longer time than the CTR group on this touch 
screen relevant part of the checkout sample. 
 
5. There was a significant difference between the EXP group and the CTR group on the re-
maining part of the checkout sample, i.e. the items not relevant to the touch screen in 
MATE. The EXP group used significantly longer time to complete this remaining part of 
the checkout sample, both in their first / pass 5 (p < 0.001) and in their second / pass 6 (p 
= 0,001) checkout attempt. 
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The comparisons of objective data from the pre start checkout in the a/c indicated that the 
EXP group did not differ from the CTR group with respect to number of errors, but that the 
EXP group used significantly longer time to complete the checkout. The EXP group used sig-
nificantly longer time on both the training sample (touch screen relevant only) and the re-
maining part of the checkout sample. 
 
Instructors have also rated the performance subjectively on instructor score sheets. These rat-
ings will be reviewed in the following. 
4.1.2 Subjective Performance Measures 
Instructor Score Sheets 
 
Instructors were asked to rate the quality of the performance of each trainee from 1 (bad) to 5 
(good) on the following 4 dimensions: knowledge of cockpit layout, speed in performing the 
checklist items, accuracy in the performance and inference of the trainees’ understanding of 
a/c system interactions. In addition, instructors were asked to predict trainees’ performance on 
the pre start FFS. These ratings were done immediately after each session. As shown in the 
figure below, the EXP group was rated lower than the CTR group on all these dimensions: 
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Figure 9: Instructor’s subjective ratings of the trainees’ performance (5 was best). The experimental 
group was rated lower (worse) than the control group on all dimensions, both in their first (EXP 5) and 
second (EXP 6) checkout attempt. During pass 5, Speed was rated significantly lower (p = 0.002), thus 
in accordance with the objective data (time). The difference in Accuracy was not significant in pass 5, 
thus also in accordance with the objective data (errors). However, all dimensions in the second attempt 
(pass 6) were rated significantly lower for the experimental group.(Instructors were asked to rate the 
trainees according to their current stage of training, i.e. the reference changed from pass 5 to pass 6.) 
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The results from the instructor score sheets during the first checkout pass (pass 5) can be 
summarised the following way: 
 
 
• Instructors rated trainees’ knowledge of cockpit layout lower for the EXP group than for 
the CTR group, but not significantly. 
 
• The EXP group was rated significantly lower (p = 0.002) than the CTR group on the di-
mension speed, corresponding to the objective measure of total time to complete the 
checkout. 
 
• The EXP group was rated lower than the CTR group on the dimension accuracy, corre-
sponding to the objective measure of total number of errors, but not significantly. 
 
• The EXP group was rated lower than the CTR group on the dimension a/c systems under-
standing, but not significantly. 
 
• Instructors were also asked to predict trainees’ performance (errors and time) during the 
pre start FFS passes (i.e. after the formal a/c checkouts). This was done as a control for 
possible inaccurate trainee evaluation. Instructors predicted that the EXP group would 
perform significantly worse (p = 0.019) than the CTR group during the three first FFS pre 
start passes (as rated by the FFS instructors). 
 
Pass 6: 
 
All dimensions in the second attempt (pass 6) were rated significantly lower for the experi-
mental group (Knowledge, p < 0.001;  Speed,  p < 0.001; Accuracy, p = 0.043; Understand-
ing,  p = 0.003; Predicted, p = 0.006). Instructors were asked to rate the trainees according to 
their current stage of training, i.e. the reference changed from pass 5 to pass 6. 
4.1.3 Objective and Subjective Measures 
The instructors rated the EXP group as lower than the CTR group on all dimensions. How-
ever, the objective data seemed not to support this. Thus, there seemed to be a mismatch be-
tween subjective instructor scoring and objective scoring of behaviour from video. There are 
several possible explanations for this. Are the EXP group slow learners to start with, or could 
the three technical training instructors be biased in the favour of the CTR group? Only one of 
these instructors rated the EXP group in MATE. This instructor was recently certified as an 
instructor for technical training and he had actually been a trainee in the CTR group, trained 
by the main a/c instructor. The third a/c instructor was the chief instructor. 
 
To seek answers regarding the proficiency skills of the EXP group, the objective video data 
during training (pass 2-4) in the two groups were compared. Data from these passes may re-
veal whether the CTR group prior to the evaluation was more skilled than the EXP group. 
Only the number of errors was considered, because the training passes were fixed to twenty 
minutes and each pass contained several interrupting explanations from the instructor. 
 
Due to practical circumstances, the error potential was sometimes not inserted, or inserted in a 
slightly different way than described in the design (e.g. interruptions from a/c maintenance, 
new instructors, easy to forget the error potential that had to be inserted manually in all condi-
tions etc.). This contributed to creating the unequal conditions for the trainees within passes. 
One way of looking into possible consequences of the uncontrolled error potential was to 
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compare the total number of errors for the two groups with and without the inserted error po-
tential. 
 
Although the total number of errors was greatly reduced, the total number of errors observed 
in the EXP group did not seem to be significantly different from the total number of errors in 
the CTR group. Furthermore, without the error potential, the number of errors was close to 
zero for most of the trainees in both groups. Consequently, the error potential was needed in 
order to observe errors at all. The comparisons of passes 2-4 will therefore include the in-
serted error potential. 
 
Below is summarised the results with respect to subjective and objective performance meas-
ures in the training passes 2 - 4: 
 
1. There was no significant difference between the CTR group and the EXP group with re-
spect to the mean number of errors observed in the EXP group during training in MATE 
(pass 2-4) and the CTR group during training in the a/c (pass 2-4). 
 
2. The EXP group was rated significantly (pass 2; p < 0.001, pass 3; p = 0.007, pass 4; p < 
0,001) lower than the CTR group on the knowledge of layout dimension in all training 
passes (2-4), even from the start of the training (pass 2). 
 
3. A strong correlation between all dimensions was found (Spearman r, p values close to 
0.001 for many of the correlation), possibly suggesting one uncertainty dimension. (The 
difference between subjective and objective measures could be due to a HALO effect.) 
4.1.4 Summary Pre Start in the Aircraft 
The EXP group does not make significantly more errors than the CTR group, but they use 
significantly more time to complete the pre start checkout. The majority of the trainees are 
approved by Skyways the second time they are in the a/c, i.e. they have an acceptable low 
number of errors and they use 15 minutes or less, but they still use significantly longer time to 
complete the checklist than does the CTR group. This is also confirmed by the instructor 
score sheets (pass 5): there were no significant difference in accuracy (objective: errors) but 
significant difference with respect to speed (objective: time). (See the Discussion section 
about subjective data/possible HALO effect). 
 
Risø-R-1324(EN)       33 
4.2 Pre Start in the Full Flight Simulator 
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Figure 10: the number of errors (total no. error categories) in the CTR group was higher than the 
number of errors for the EXP (MATE) group in all three passes, but not significantly so. 
 
 
1. The FFS passes were combined pre starts and engine starts. There was no systematic in-
sertion of an error potential during the pre start parts of the passes. Hence very few errors 
were made and most errors were related to the difference between the A- and B-type (the 
auto coarsen system). When the first three FFS passes were collapsed, the CTR group had 
between 2.0 and 3.0 errors at an average. The EXP group had approximately 1 error in all 
three passes. No significant results were produced. At this point in time, the EXP group 
had more training in the a/c than the CTR group (familiarisation pass number 8, plus 
additional checkout passes). 
 
2. The total number of errors in the CTR group was higher than the total number of errors in 
the EXP group in the first two passes, but not significantly. This indicates that the instruc-
tors were less good at predicting performance. The two a/c checkout instructors predicted 
that the EXP group would perform significantly worse than the CTR group in the first 
FFS passes. These predictions were made after the training passes during the a/c checkout 
pass 5 (p = 0.019) and pass 6 (p = 0.006). (Predictions were also made during the last 
training passes, but instructors were asked to predict based on the current stage of train-
ing.) 
 
The next section will report, using the same type of tests, results from the analyses of the en-
gine start samples in the full flight simulator. A distinction was made between normal, i.e. no 
inserted error potential, and abnormal engine starts, i.e. hung and hot starts (inserted abnor-
malities). 
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4.3 Normal Engine Start in the Full Flight Simulator 
First, the number of errors (all categories) in both groups was compared. 
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Figure 11: the number of errors (all categories). 
 
1. When the numbers of errors (all categories) observed in the three first FFS passes were 
collapsed, the number of errors in the EXP group was significantly (p = 0.043) higher 
than in the CTR group. When looking at the three passes separately, a higher number of 
errors were observed in the EXP group in the two first passes, but this difference was not 
significant. The total number of errors was stabilised between 8 and 9 errors for both 
groups in pass 3. 
2. As the figure below shows, callout errors stood out as the most common error during 
normal starts. The EXP group had more errors related to callouts than the CTR group in 
the first and in the second passes. This difference was significant in the first pass (p = 
0.006). The CTR group had more callout errors than the EXP group in the third pass, but 
not significantly. When all 3 passes were collapsed, the EXP group tended towards hav-
ing more callout errors than the CTR group. This tendency was very close to the .05 level 
(p = 0.052). 
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Engine start (normal) - main error categories
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Figure 12: Callout errors stand out as the most common error in all three passes. There was a ten-
dency for the EXP group to commit more callout errors (all three passes collapsed / average). 
 
3. When all three passes were collapsed, there was a tendency for the EXP group to have 
more role errors, but there was never more than one role error per crew combination (at 
an average). 
 
A closer analysis of the callout errors revealed that the majority of these were commission 
errors. This means that the callout phraseology deviated from the correct phraseology as de-
scribed in the operational definition of the extended checklist, (but that there was a callout 
concerning relevant checklist items at the relevant place). If this category is removed from the 
data material, it turns out that: 
 
4. There was no significant difference between the CTR and the EXP groups during normal 
starts when callout commission errors were removed from the comparison. See figure be-
low. 
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Figure 13: callout commission errors were removed and no significant differences were found between 
the two groups during normal engine starts. 
4.4 Abnormal Engine Start in the Full Flight Simulator 
1. The CTR group had abnormal starts for the first time in pass 2 and the EXP group had 
abnormal starts their first time in pass 3. The control group had significantly (p = 0.03) 
more configuration errors than the EXP group in this comparison. 
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Engine start (abnormal) - main categories
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Figure 14: the CTR group had significantly more configuration errors than the EXP group. The callout 
commission errors have been removed. 
 
 
2. When all passes with abnormal starts were collapsed (pass 2-3 for the CTR group and 
pass 3 for the EXP group), the number of errors observed in the CTR group was signifi-
cantly (p = 0.014) higher than in the EXP group. 
 
 
3. When all passes with abnormal starts were collapsed (average value, pass 2-3 for the CTR 
group and pass 3 for the EXP group), the CTR group had significantly (p = 0.024) more 
configuration errors than the EXP group. 
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Engine start (abnormal) - average (pass 1-3)
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Figure 15: number of errors when passes 2-3 were collapsed (average) 
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Figure 16: the number of errors observed in the CTR group was significantly higher than the number 
of errors observed for the EXP group in the abnormal trials. There were no abnormal trials in the first 
pass. The EXP group was not exposed to abnormal trials in the second pass. 
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4.5 Instructors’ and Trainees’ Opinions of MATE 
Eight MATE trainees and 4 instructors (2 from the a/c checkout and 2 from the FFS training) 
have answered the opinion questionnaires (appendix 11.8). The questions were open; thus 
respondents were free to express any opinion they had on the MATE. The answers were in-
terpreted, summarised in keywords and compared question by question (item by item). 
 
Negative comments: these were mostly related to the pre start training. The reduced quality of 
performance (MATE trainees compared with the CTR group) during the a/c pre start checkout 
was attributed to (a) inaccurate and unreliable MATE touch screens and (b) to the lack of fa-
miliarisation with the real a/c cockpit environment, specifically non-touch screen relevant 
checklist items (e.g. emergency equipment). It was claimed that the MATE prototype could 
not replace pre start training in the a/c. 
 
Positive comments: a higher level of fidelity (i.e. realism/interactivity) on training devices 
was appreciated on a general basis. The possibility for interaction with dynamic a/c systems 
was generally recognised as the strength of MATE training. It was claimed that the MATE 
prototype was a better engine start trainer than the power plant trainer was. 
 
Answers that could be interpreted as in agreement with each other (1-4): 
 
1. The touch screen: All 12 respondents agreed that the functionality of the touch screen in 
MATE was inaccurate and not reliable, and that this would have to improve considerably 
in order to operate switches effectively (this version of MATE had a real throttle box). 
The difficulties with operating switches was a continuous problem because (a) switches 
that were already set were moved accidentally, i.e. the touch screen was too sensitive, (b) 
switches that were about to be set could not be moved in a proper way, (c) it was easy to 
loose contact with a switch while moving it, and (d) the simultaneous operation of two 
switches was very difficult (dual input). The starter and ignition switches were mentioned 
as very problematic. These problems caused the MATE training to be unnecessary frus-
trating and time consuming. One of the a/c instructors thought that the touch screen prob-
lems also caused a decreased motivation for training and a general confusion regarding 
the real a/c systems functionality. 
 
2. Familiarisation with the a/c: The 2 a/c instructors agreed that MATE trainees performed 
worse than the CTR group during the a/c checkout. The instructors felt that MATE train-
ees were less confident in the real cockpit, as compared to the CTR group. The CTR 
group was more at home, they had the feel. These aspects of the performance in the cock-
pit were not well defined by the instructors, but the importance of these instructor opin-
ions were emphasised by the extra familiarisation pass assigned to the MATE (EXP) 
group when the checkout was completed. The MATE trainees also emphasised the need 
for familiarisation with the real cockpit as a part of the transfer from MATE. All respon-
dents agreed that MATE could not stand-alone, i.e. replace the a/c training.  
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3. Performance in the FFS: The 2 FFS instructors agreed that no important differences be-
tween the trainees in the FFS could be attributed to MATE training. The trainees did not 
seem to think that difficulties in the MATE affected their performance in the FFS nega-
tively. All respondents seemed to agree that a training environment with a relatively high 
level of fidelity would facilitate the training of dynamic tasks better than environments 
with a lower level of fidelity. Although not confirmed by the 2 FFS instructors, the 
MATE trainees agreed on the impression that engine start training (normal and abnormal 
starts) in MATE would produce better results than engine start training in the power plant 
trainer. This impression was attributed to the increased fidelity, i.e. realism, in MATE. 
 
4. Ideas on how to improve the MATE: the touch screen problems must be solved. Given 
that MATE actually works (touch screens), the mock-up could be improved by building a 
back panel so that emergency equipment, manuals etc. can be included. Panel lighting 
(contrast) should also be improved and more sound effects should be included to increase 
the realism. More a/c systems should be implemented, so that MATE can be used for trai-
ning procedures related to automation and teamwork (2 pilot system).  
5 Discussion 
Instructors were responsible for most of the practical day-to-day data recording (except in the 
a/c), but they received different amount of briefing with respect to recording techniques and 
the design. This was due to practical limitations in their schedules (they were mostly flying 
when not instructing), but they all received the same written instructions for how to record 
data. Good will from the Skyways personnel ensured a minimum loss of data, but attempts to 
include experimental control suffered from these variations (opportunity to have briefings), 
specifically the default configurations and the inserted error potentials during the pre-start 
sample. Generally, the limited possibility to control variables in the evaluation was a direct 
consequence of following real training courses: the first priority was to train pilots effectively 
and not to evaluate MATE. 
 
The error categorisation system was sensitive to differences underlying the first impression of 
the data material. By combining error types and error modes, we found that (a) callout com-
mission error, i.e. incorrect callout phrases, was the main factor responsible for the differ-
ences in favour of the CTR group during normal starts and (b) the CTR group had signifi-
cantly more configuration errors during abnormal starts. These were important findings that 
would have been overlooked by limiting the analyses to comparing the total number of errors. 
However, further analyses on this level of resolution, i.e. looking at all combinations of types 
and modes, did not give any clear picture, except for the limited impact of omission transition 
errors. There were too few observations in each category to look closer at each combination 
of error type and mode (no significant results were produced). 
 
The main evaluation of the pre start training in MATE was done in comparison with the real 
a/c, during the checkout of real pilots. Furthermore, the MATE prototype was only a live pa-
per tiger, i.e. no special pedagogical tools were implemented. This gave little room for the 
MATE to stand out as a better alternative (than a/c and paper tiger) for the pre start part of the 
training. Further more, the main task during this checklist, i.e. checking cockpit configuration, 
can be classified as a relatively simple pattern recognition task. One would perhaps not expect 
a simulation of dynamic system interaction to be necessary in tasks that mostly require picture 
like representations, i.e. the paper tiger and the checklist may be sufficient for learning the 
cockpit layout and configuration previous to the a/c cockpit familiarisation. Generally, learn-
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ing new procedures in a new a/c system is different from training (new) procedures in a well-
known a/c system. One would expect a novice pilot to need as much practical experience 
with the real a/c as possible. An experienced pilot would maybe not have this need for high 
fidelity during training of procedures. Thus, flying by instruments, crew resource manage-
ment training (CRM) and testing of new instrumentation could be interesting use of MATE. 
 
One expectation was that the EXP group could end up having more errors than the CTR group 
when transferred directly to the a/c, but that the EXP group would quickly approach the ac-
ceptable level of errors (that the control group had). Instead it was found that the amount of 
errors did not differ between the groups, but that the EXP group used significantly longer time 
to complete the pre start checklist. The extra use of time is in accordance with preliminary 
studies (Andersen and Hansen, 1996). However, no trainee used more than 20 minutes. In 
their second attempt, all EXP trainees used less than 15 minutes (the official limit for ap-
proval), but still significantly longer time than the CTR group. (The mean time in this second 
checkout was14 minutes.) The question can be raised if the time used to complete the check-
list really should be unacceptable if it was below 20 minutes. The total time for completing 
the checklist is not related to the immediate safe configuration of the cockpit and the Skyways 
15 minutes limit seems tough compared with the 20 minutes limit at SAS. 
 
Skyways arranged in total 3 extra a/c passes for the EXP group (checkout 6-7 and familiarisa-
tion pass 8). The CTR group had 4 training passes before the checkout pass (pass 5), thus it 
seems like the number of passes that can be saved in the a/c is marginal. The reduction of a/c 
passes in comparison with the CTR group was minimum 1 pass. The reduction was maximum 
3 passes if the familiarisation pass number 8 and pass number 7  (two trainees) are excluded. 
Thus, the use of the MATE prototype for this type of pre start training may be sufficient in 
terms of errors and time, but users of the prototype set-up of MATE may not view MATE 
training as cost effective for training pre starts. It can also be argued that training normal en-
gine starts is sufficient in the power plant trainer. However, MATE may provide better train-
ing than the power plant trainer for handling abnormal engine starts. 
 
In this evaluation, less emphasis was put on the time to complete the pre start checklist. This 
was because: (1) there is no direct a/c system consequences related to the total time, and (2) 
because it seems to be practically less important, as exemplified with the different time limits 
in Skyways and SAS. However, Skyways instructors were of the opinion that the checklist 
performance had to be improved for all EXP trainees by adding a familiarisation pass (pass 
8). Most trainees from the EXP group were officially approved by Skyways the second time 
in the a/c, and the question concerning the need for an additional familiarisation pass that in-
cluded training on the pre start checklist samples can therefore be raised. Given that the EXP 
group really needed an additional pass related to these tasks, one might suspect that the ap-
proval of the EXP group was due to maintaining the group motivation, i.e. no trainee should 
suffer from being a member of the EXP group. Thus, a familiarisation pass would be better 
than a series of failures in formal checkout passes. 
 
The instructors consistently rated the CTR group higher than the EXP group. Does this imply 
that the CTR group was better to start with? It was not possible to allocate the subjects ran-
domly to the groups or to match subjects on background variables thought to be important. 
However, there did not seem to be differences between the groups with respect to the objec-
tively scored number of errors during training (passes 2-4). The requirement for familiarisa-
tion could be due to a possible HALO effect, i.e. a consistent instructor bias in the disfavour 
of the EXP group. The two instructors (during checkout) predicted that the CTR group would 
perform significantly better than the EXP group on the pre start checklist when rated in the 
FFS. These predictions were made after the training passes during the a/c checkout pass 5 (p 
= 0.019) and pass 6 (p = 0.006). However, the analysis of objective data (number of errors) 
showed a different result, i.e. the EXP group performed slightly better than the CTR group 
during the pre starts checklist in the FFS, but not significantly. The EXP group now had addi-
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tional familiarisation related to the pre start, but these results may indicate that the instructors 
were less good at predicting the performance of trainees: the ratings were always in favour of 
the CTR group, i.e. by definition no top guns in the EXP group. Further more, all the instruc-
tor dimensions correlate strongly (Spearman r, p < 0.01, for 6 out of 10 combinations) and all 
the significant correlations were found in the EXP group. Thus, it could be argued that the 
instructor evaluation in the EXP group was on a more general level, perhaps an uncertainty 
(or confidence) dimension. A HALO effect is also supported from the fact that EXP trainees 
received significantly lower ratings on knowledge of cockpit layout already from their first 
training pass, i.e. directly after training in paper tiger (where they had equal amount of train-
ing). Perhaps the perceived overall quality of the EXP group performance was coloured by 
the need for more time to complete the checklist? There is also a risk that the objective meas-
ures were insensitive to important aspects of the trainees’ performance and that the instructors 
were able to observe other (more ill defined) aspects of how confident the trainees were. In 
the opinion questionnaires, the instructors emphasised that MATE trainees were less confi-
dent and unfamiliar with the cockpit. This was also confirmed by the trainees and it could be a 
reason for the relatively low ratings. It is perhaps likely that experienced instructors can sense 
how confident/secure a trainee is in the cockpit. Nevertheless, all MATE trainees had to par-
ticipate in familiarisation, but the familiarisation problem was limited to the a/c checkout. 
When trainees were approved for FFS training, this difference had disappeared. The FFS in-
structors answered (opinion questionnaires) that no important differences observed between 
trainees in the FFS could be attributed to the MATE training (due to the project delay and 
limited analysis resources, the FFS instructor’s subjective ratings were not included in the 
evaluation). 
 
The answers from the FFS instructors is also relevant with respect to the indication that 
MATE trainees performed better on abnormal engine starts: FFS instructors did not mention 
this difference, although MATE trainees seemed to be convinced that they were good at diag-
nosing abnormal starts due to MATE training. These trainees have not trained abnormal starts 
in the power plant trainer (but they were instructed on normal engine starts in the power plant 
trainer and they have possibly discussed engine start training with other pilots). It is also clear 
that the two types of abnormal starts look very similar on the instrument readings (both starts 
look hot, i.e. high ITT) in both the power plant trainer and the MATE. Thus, an actual im-
provement of abnormal engine start diagnosis due to MATE training can be questioned. How-
ever, trainees were convinced that the increased level of fidelity/realism was a valuable sup-
port in the engine start training. There is support for this opinion in the objective data that in-
dicate a better handling of abnormal engine starts for the MATE group. The analysis of the 
data from the engine starts (passes 1-3) showed that the total number of errors observed in the 
EXP group was higher than for the CTR group during normal engine starts, but almost all the 
errors were related to callouts. There is no obvious reason why callout errors should be 
strongly related to training in MATE. The tendency is in a different direction during abnormal 
starts. Here, almost all errors are related to configuration errors and they are mainly in the 
CTR group. Hence, the tendency is that the EXP group has a better performance during ab-
normal starts than the CTR group. 
 
The operational definition of a correct callout included the verbatim execution of the callout 
phraseology given in the extended checklist. The descriptive scoring had as an objective to 
record the callouts word-for-word. This is a relatively easy (and probably reliable) way of 
scoring, i.e. to avoid judgements about what should constitute a clear callout. The scoring of 
callouts was successful in most instances, but sometimes inhibited by the problems with 
sound in the FFS trails with the EXP group. In these instances, the scoring was related to the 
parts of the callout possible to hear, i.e. the morphemes. In sum, the scoring and categorisa-
tion of callouts has been very detailed: the smallest observable deviation from the correct 
phrase in the checklist would constitute a callout error of commission. On the other hand, 
perhaps the criteria used for scoring callouts were too detailed, i.e. that some deviation from 
the correct callout should be allowed (if it can still be understood). Exactly how the callout 
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deviates from the checklist was described in the score sheet, but such differences were not 
incorporated in the error categorisation system. To make the criteria for a correct callout less 
detailed, the two groups were compared without callout errors of commission, i.e. without the 
callouts with inaccurate phraseology (regardless how serious inaccuracy). The tendency for 
the EXP group to commit more callout errors than the CTR group disappeared and there were 
no significant differences between the groups on any categories during normal starts. There 
was a tendency for the EXP group to be involved in more role errors, but the number of role 
errors was very low in all passes (approximately 1 error at an average). When trainees uttered 
the callouts inaccurately, they were usually not corrected by the instructors. Neither were trai-
nees reminded if the callout was omitted. When instructors did correct the use of a callout, 
they most often did not execute the callout in the exact word-for-word format described in the 
extended checklist. Hence, the feedback provided to the trainees did not support learning the 
callouts exactly the way they are described in the extended checklist. This instructor practice 
(at least during FFS instructions in this evaluation) demonstrates a lower emphasis on the ac-
curacy of callouts than the correctness of cockpit configuration. Such a practice, if it exists in 
line operation, is to some extent conflicting with the purpose of using formalised communica-
tion. 
 
An important part of the results is the indication that training in MATE may improve per-
formance during abnormal engine starts. This inference is based on the difference in configu-
ration errors. Less emphasis was placed on the fact that the EXP group had more callout 
commission errors during normal starts. There are several reasons for this emphasis on error 
types. First, instructors did not themselves put great emphasis on callout errors. Perhaps this 
type of errors is viewed as secondary to configuration errors. A possible explanation for this 
could be related to the perceived seriousness of the callout error: a callout can be wrong in 
relation to the operational definition, but still be interpreted correctly by trainees (and instruc-
tors). Thus, the callout error may not cause inefficient communication about the system status. 
Trainees were often corrected when involved with configuration errors, but rarely corrected 
(and inaccurately corrected) when involved with callout errors. Consequentially, callout errors 
stand out as a major error category, especially during normal starts. This is one reason to 
compare the groups without callout commission errors. Further more, the potential for com-
mitting callout errors is low if a malfunctioning start is detected (and all abnormal starts were 
detected), because the abnormal checklist contains more configuration actions. The abnormal 
start is probably also more difficult than normal starts, because more system feedback must be 
interpreted and corrective actions must be initiated within given time windows. Thus, the shift 
from callout errors during normal starts to configuration errors during abnormal starts is not 
surprising. The interesting part is that 1) a significantly higher amount of configuration errors 
was observed for the CTR group and 2) this was independent of the removal of errors in the 
omission transition mode (representing between 2 – 3 possible configuration errors in the ab-
normal checklist). Higher fidelity, i.e. spatial relationships, scanning of instruments and a 
more realistic environment in the MATE than in the power plant trainer stand out as a possi-
ble explanation to this effect. Further evaluations of MATE could include e.g. measures of 
scan patterns and cognitive measures of diagnosis to explain why MATE is supporting the 
training of abnormal starts better than the power plant trainer. 
 
Omission transition errors were a sub category of omission errors during the transition from 
an abnormal start trial to the next engine start trial. Omission transition errors were observed 
only in the CTR group and they were mainly related to motoring and callouts (see the opera-
tional definition of the checklist, appendix 11.1). These errors were observed during transi-
tions between separate engine starts involving pre-defined abnormalities, but the trainees did 
not complete the abnormal checklist nor did they complete the beginning of the next checklist 
reading. (However, if a trainee shut down for any other reason than the pre defined error po-
tential, the repetition of checklist items up to the point where the trainee failed was disre-
garded, see the analysis chapter.) This specific type of omission error represented approxi-
mately 20% of all the errors observed in the CTR group during abnormal engine starts (51 
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errors out of 253 errors total in pass 2-3). Omission transition errors represented approxi-
mately half (49%) of all the CTR group omission errors during abnormal starts (51 omission 
transition errors out of 104 omission errors in pass 2-3). Thus, one would expect this type of 
error to have an impact on the comparison: if the omission transition errors are included in the 
data comparison (pass 2-3 in the FFS), then the potential for errors in the CTR group is higher 
than without omission transition errors. This could bias the comparison to the advantage of 
the EXP group. If the omission transition errors are removed from the comparison, then the 
potential for errors in the CTR group decreases. This potential for errors includes callout 
omission errors, i.e. the first four callouts of the next start trial are missing. The removal of 
these transition errors could bias the comparison to the disadvantage of the EXP group, espe-
cially since a tendency seemed to be that the EXP group had more callout errors than the CTR 
group (although these errors turned out to be callout commission errors). 
 
Recall that the CTR group had significantly more errors in total than the EXP group during 
abnormal starts, both when (a) pass 2 and pass 3 were compared (first trails with abnormal 
starts) and when (b) these two passes were collapsed (average). The main result was un-
changed when the omission transition errors were removed, but the difference in the total 
number of errors during abnormal starts was less vivid. When the omission transition errors 
were removed, i.e. a disadvantage to the EXP group, then (a) no significant difference was 
found in the total number of errors in the pass 2 versus pass 3 comparison and (b) the signifi-
cant difference in the total number of errors (average pass 2-3) was reduced to a tendency (p = 
0.106). However, the CTR group still had significantly more configuration errors, so the main 
result for abnormal starts was not changed by the comparison with and without omission tran-
sition errors. 
 
It is unclear why it was trainees in the CTR group that had transition errors. One explanation 
could be that instructors allowed these jumps between incomplete start trials. However, it is 
not likely that the instructors told the CTR group trainees, implicitly or explicitly, to perform 
these shortcuts because: (a) the FFS instructors instructed in both groups (and when asked, the 
chief instructor confirmed that each engine start trial should be complete), (b) there was not 
much time to save (seconds) and (c) the handling of abnormal starts was a major part of the 
engine start training. It is important to be familiar with the use of the abnormal checklist, to 
know why motoring is needed and to have practice in the correct timing of motoring (the 3 
minutes delay between starts is of course disregarded during expensive simulator time). It is 
also important to practice the correct callouts at the beginning of a new start trial. 
 
Thus, it seems like the trainees in the CTR group have put less emphasis on the correct han-
dling of abnormal engine starts. This could be partly explained by their future role in line op-
eration: the crew starts the engine, but it is the captain (L pilot) that has the responsibility and 
it is the captain that performs shutdown and motoring. The first officers will not be required 
to do this part of engine starts in line operation. All trainees in the CTR group were to be li-
censed as first officers, but so were the trainees in the EXP group (one trainee in the EXP 
group was to be licensed as a captain). First officers must nevertheless learn how to start the 
engines, in order to co-operate with the captain. For training purposes, this type of errors 
should not be allowed because the learning of correct abnormal and callout procedures will 
not be optimal. 
 
A third speculation as to why CTR group trainees had omission transition errors could be re-
lated to the fidelity of the training environments. The power plant trainer (CTR) had real a/c 
start and ignition switches, but the representation of the cockpit (paper tiger/overhead panel) 
and the a/c instruments (desktop computer) was more arbitrary than in the MATE. It could be 
speculated that the higher fidelity of the visual surroundings, the a/c systems feedback and the 
role-play in MATE might have encouraged a more realistic checklist performance. Neverthe-
less, the CTR group should have had feedback on this type of erroneous transitions, in order 
to perform correct and complete sessions with abnormal starts. There is no doubt that e.g. a 
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hot start must be handled by immediate shutdown and motoring and shortcuts are not allowed 
in any checklist reading. 
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6 Lessons Learned 
This section deals with practical/technical problems during the evaluation. 
 
• The MATE set-up tested in this evaluation was the first prototype. The touch screen was 
not fully developed until the evaluation started and several of the training features thought 
to be superior to existing training were actually not implemented at the time of testing. 
This includes the procedure training assistance (PTA) and the debriefing and analysis 
tool. These features should be tested to see if they could actually improve training effects 
compared to existing training in e.g. the power plant trainer. The CTR group had prob-
lems related to transitions (abnormal starts) and the EXP group had problems related to 
callouts. These two error types stand out as examples of training issues to be emphasised 
in the PTA, when this is to be implemented in the MATE. Also, the implementation of an 
electronic checklist could enable the MATE to monitor checklist performance by means 
of e.g. word recognition and eye movement tracking. 
 
• Skyways was not a partner in the project, thus the project had to rely on the good will of 
instructors and trainees. All personnel and trainees at Skyways showed interest in the pro-
ject and an exceptionally good will to make things happen. In retrospect however, it turns 
out that this positive attitude was insufficient for conducting this type of data recording, 
e.g. maintaining a sufficient degree of experimental control. The personnel collecting data 
in MATE and FFS, mostly Skyways instructors, should be committed in a much stronger 
way in order to take more responsibility for all the problems that are inevitable during 
such complex data collection in the field. Key personnel could be paid and trained, or a 
researcher could be present during all the data collection. The cost of having one fully in-
formed researcher/research assistant (and preferably a backup researcher) in the field dur-
ing data collection is probably worth the price when measured against the data quality, 
delayed analyses, the cost of long distance trouble shooting and a huge amount of travel-
ling between locations (Risø is in Denmark. Data collection took place at Arlanda in 
Sweden). A more permanent stay in the field would probably enable the researcher to do 
the time consuming backup copying and perhaps the first raw scoring of data. Also, vari-
ous delays of Skyway’s training schedule caused a general delay of the evaluation and 
some cancellations of analyses. Such unexpected delays are nobody’s fault, but they must 
to some extent be a part of the evaluation planning. 
 
• There were no log facilities implemented in MATE. A log could have made video analy-
ses of the MATE cockpit configuration unnecessary (leaving time to focus on other parts 
of the analyses). 
 
• Another aspect of the MATE system that was not fully implemented was the instructor 
control station. The error potential had to be set manually, thus leaving a potential for er-
rors also when inserting this error potential. In retrospect it is clear that the potential for 
errors of omissions was different both within and between passes (all conditions). A more 
consistent pre defined default cockpit configuration could have contributed to solve this 
problem. Such a pre defined configuration could be automatic in MATE (but not in the 
other conditions). The only pre defined automatic configuration possible in MATE at the 
time was the malfunctioning of lamps (and this was only observed during the checkout). 
 
• The tasks in the selected samples should have been tested in pilot studies. This would 
have enabled a more thorough consideration of what methods to apply and perhaps influ-
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enced on how to design the training tasks. This would have influenced the use of error po-
tentials and perhaps additional methodologies to observe e.g. system variables, pilot’s in-
formation gathering and cognitive measures like pilot’s diagnosis. An example: a consid-
erable amount of time was used to develop a measure of trainees’ diagnosis of abnormal 
engine starts. However, it was later discovered that the training devices for engine start, 
i.e. the power plant trainer and the MATE, did not display vivid differences between the 
two types of abnormal starts used in this evaluation. MATE used the same system simula-
tion (algorithms) as the power plant trainer. It turned out that the symptoms of a hung 
start were almost identical to the symptoms of a hot start: both instances looked like a hot 
start (abnormal ITT). An important part of training the diagnosis of these two types of ab-
normal starts, was to monitor both the Ng display (possible hung start / Ng is a measure 
of the gas turbine acceleration) and the ITT display (possible hot start / ITT is a measure 
of the temperature between the gas and power turbine). According to an experienced in-
structor at SAS Flight Academy, it would be almost impossible for a novice to spot the 
difference between hung and hot starts, given the displayed symptoms in the power plant 
trainer and in the MATE. Trainees would be able to diagnose the start as abnormal just 
from monitoring the ITT display (i.e. a relatively easy task compared to monitor both dis-
plays), but less able to elaborate on what kind of abnormality this indication represented. 
It is possible to have hung starts developing into hot starts (dependent of the cause of the 
hung start), but these instances are perhaps not good examples for learning about the main 
differences between hung and hot starts. In the choice of making MATE a better training 
device (i.e. making this difference more vivid), versus the control with equal training 
conditions, it was decided not to improve the simulation of differences between hung and 
hot starts in MATE. Thus the measure of diagnosis had to be taken out of the evaluation. 
This could perhaps have been avoided if various pre studies/investigations of the tasks 
had been performed, so that the appropriate measures could be developed before the eva-
luation started. 
 
Despite all this, the loss of data was not serious and we have gained more experience 
with data collection in the field, i.e. in a realistic environment, without any kind of sup-
port for data collection (e.g. no system logs in any of the conditions, portable battery 
power only, no separate lighting for video, very limited working space, not allowed to in-
terfere etc.). 
 
48                                                                                                                Risø-R-1324(EN)   
7 Conclusion 
Summary of Results: 
It was clear that the MATE touch screen must be improved. The main findings concerning 
training effects were: (1) the amount of errors observed in the experimental MATE group did 
not differ from the amount of errors observed in the control group, as far as the pre-start 
checklist was concerned. However, the MATE trainees (EXP) did use significantly longer 
time to complete the pre start tasks and the instructors perceived the MATE trainees as less 
confident. MATE trainees need familiarisation with the a/c after pre start training in the 
MATE prototype. This familiarisation has at least two aspects: (1) the touch screen simulation 
of real electro mechanical switches and controls and (2) managing tasks that were explained 
using paper tiger parts of MATE (pictures) and demo objects. Less a/c familiarisation was 
needed than the total amount of a/c passes needed to train and check out the CTR group. 
Thus, the amount of (expensive) time needed for training in the aircraft was slightly reduced. 
(2) MATE trainees seemed to have more errors related to callouts than the control group dur-
ing normal engine starts, but a more thorough analysis indicated that the two groups per-
formed equally well on normal engine starts. (3) The control group had significantly more 
errors related to cockpit configuration than the MATE trainees had during abnormal engine 
starts. Thus, the MATE trainees performed better than the control group during abnormal en-
gine starts. 
 
Main Conclusion: 
The comparison of MATE trainees with conventional trainees revealed that when MATE trai-
nees transferred to the real a/c without any previous a/c familiarisation, they used slightly 
longer time to complete the pre start checklist. The MATE trainees were not involved in more 
checklist errors than the conventional trainees were, but the MATE trainees seemed to be less 
confident than conventional trainees were. When the MATE trainees had become familiar 
with the real cockpit, then no important differences could be observed between the two 
groups, except for performance during abnormal starts. MATE trainees had better perform-
ance on abnormal engine starts. The main conclusion regarding training effects is that (a) the 
performance of MATE trainees is good enough if they are given familiarisation with the real 
cockpit environment and (b) the major value of the MATE prototype seems to lie in the train-
ing of dynamic tasks, such as engine starts. 
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8 Abbreviations 
a/c   aircraft 
AV   Audio/Visual 
CTR   Control group 
DERA   Defence and Evaluation Research Agency, UK 
DVD   Digital Video 
EXP   Experimental group 
FFS   Full Flight Simulator 
L   Left (pilot) 
MATE   Multi Aircraft Training Environment 
MEL   Minimum Equipment List (part of the checklist) 
R   Right (pilot) 
RISØ   Risø National Laboratory, Denmark 
SAAB 340  Commuter aircraft used by Skyways (A-type and B-type) 
Skyways  Swedish airline 
SVHS   Super VHS 
SVHS-C  Super CVHS-Compact 
VHS   Ordinary (black and white) 
9 References 
Andersen H.B. and Hansen J.P. (1996): Comparing transfer of training of a standard control panel and 
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10 Appendix 
Instructions to instructors/subjects and tools for measurements are included. Font size and 
layout are edited to save space. Detailed instructions on how to operate equipment, video logs 
etc. are left out. 
 
 
 
Contents: 
 
 
11.1  The Checklist with Score Sheet 
11.2  The Error Potential 
11.3  The Error Categorisation Sheet 
11.4  The What-To-Do-List for Instructors 
11.5  The Instructor Notes, pre start 
11.6  The Instructor Score Sheets, pre start 
11.7 The Instructors Score Sheet, combined pre start and engine start 
11.8 The Trainees’ and Instructors’ Opinions Questionnaires 
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10.1 Checklist with Score Sheet 
 
 
 
This is the operational definition (version 6.0) of the Skyways extended checklist (version 960901) used for describing deviating actions, one complete sheet for each session. 
 
 
CTR-FFS-pre (1-3) + eng (1-3) sample 
Instructor: 
 
Pass No: Crew Letter LP: Crew Letter RP: 
Recording Date: Score 1 date:                   By: Score 2 date:                    By:                        Average time spent: 
Data File Name: en _(Mate/FFS)_(pass no.)(2 x unique crew letters) Data description: CTR-FFS-pre(1-2) + eng (1-6) sample 
   
L Start No. 1 (comment): Type Normal: Type Abnormal: 
L Start No. 2 (comment): Type Normal: Type Abnormal: 
   
R Start No. 1 (comment):  Type Normal: Type Abnormal: 
R Start No. 2 (comment): Type Normal: Type Abnormal: 
   
Video “overhead panel” / Tape Number (D original): Event: Counter: 
Video “throttlebox” / Tape Number (VHS original): Event: Counter: 
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Observable pilot performance (actions) deviating from the performance described in the Skyways extended checklist 960901: 
 
Template for pre start scoring in FFS is included. The pre start error potential is logged in the instructor pre + eng score sheet. 
 
Engine start sample: from “Start of Engines” (engine checklist item no. 1) to “After Engine Start”. An “engine start” (normal and abnormal) is the attempt of one crew com-
bination to start one of the engines. Several start attempts on one engine is part of the same engine start, provided that the failure to start the engine is due to performance de-
viating from the checklist. If the failure to start an engine is due to the inserted error potential (hung or hot start), or because the instructor orders a new start (check the in-
structor score sheet), then the second attempt to start that same engine is considered a new engine start. 
 
A new engine start is always performed (and scored) from engine checklist item no. 1. When there is a shutdown for reasons other than the inserted error potential/instructor 
orders (not a new start), the analyst will disregard performance in the repetition of checklist items up to the point where this start attempt failed (it does not matter if they start 
at no 1 or not, and if they do start at no 1, then new deviations are irrelevant.) 
 
All deviations from the checklist must be described: Actions: call outs & orders / switches & controls. Item sequences (all actions) both between and within items. Time (ac-
tions in bold): scored if the maximum limit is exceeded. L or R pilot (P): scored if their role is reversed. Type of start and possible problems are logged in the instructor pre + 
eng score sheets. 
 
 
V = correct performance, / = missing, otherwise describe (use “other” if not enough space) 
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Pre Start Sample. FFS is a B type / B checklist used (AutoC OFF) 
EXT. PWR Ext.pwr ON + Voltage sel.  
BATTERIES Battery L + R ON  
 Voltage L +  R/ min 24V  
INVERTERS MAIN Inv./ ON  
 STB Inv./ MAIN  
AVIONICS Left/ ON  
 Middle/ ON  
 Right/ ON  
O/H Emergency Light/ OFF  
SWITCHES Temp. Select L/ AUTO   
 Temp. Select R/ AUTO  
 Auto Coars./ OFF  
 Boot Indicator/ ON  
 No Smoking/ ON  
LAMP/ Lamps Sw./  DOWN:cont  
SMOKE/ Lamps Sw./ UP: cont  
BLEED Smoke Sw./ UP: cont  
 Bleed Leak/ L + R  
FIRE & FIRE Fire Test Sw./ L + R  
SHORT Fire Short Sw./ UP  
SHAKER &  Stall 1/  UP: cont  
PUSHER  Stall 2/  UP: cont  
 Stall 1&2/ UP: dual/cont  
 Stall 1&2/ DOWN: du-
al/cont 
 
ERROR/other   
 
54                                                                                                                Risø-R-1324(EN)    
Normal/Abnormal Engine Start Sample (always motoring start) 
Checklist Items Description of All Deviations from Correct Performance of Checklist Items 
Starting Left or Right1: LEFT ENGINE: RIGHT ENGINE: 
(start from no. 1) START NO. 1 START NO. 2 START NO. 1 START NO. 2 
1 call out “starting right” LP     
2 call out “right prop free” R/L     
 L/R PL ground idle LP observe:  observe:  
 L/R CL fuel off      
 L/R ignition sw off      
 if BUS TIE CONN green  observe:  observe:  
3 call out “buss tie” LP     
 if NO BAT START out  observe:  observe:  
4 call out “NO no bat start”2      
 
5 hold starter sw in L/R pos. LP     
6 and call out “timing” LP     
 max 30 sec. (# 10/11) P (count to 30)  (count to 30)  
7  order “fuel on” LP     
8 L/R CL to START 
and immediately 
RP     
9 call out (L/R) “fuel is on” RP     
10 x ign. sw to norm ASAP3 LP     
 within 2 sec. from # 8      
       
IF  2 SECONDS EXCEEDED (Failure to Start): SHUTDOWN + MOTORING (page 8) 
       
11 Release st sw (ASAP) LP     
12 R hand on CL  LP     
       
                                                     
1 The trainee continues to operate the L or R system according to this callout. Callouts and actions must correspond. (if not: this is one deviation only, i.e. disregard repetition of chekl. items). 
Clues to detect start L/R: the handgrip on the starter switch + lights on fuel panel: L/R main pump. 
2 If light comes on during engine start, continue. If light is not out before engine start, then terminate the start. 
3 Otherwise: failure to start the engine. 
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IF ABNORMAL4 (See Instructor Score Sheet): SHUTDOWN + MOTORING + READ CHECKL/prior to next attempt (page 8) 
       
13 callo. “Ng, fuel flow, ITT” LP     
14 call out “engine oil” RP     
15 call out “prop oil” RP     
 lights out engine+fuel pane  observe:  observe:  
16 L/R5: call out “engines and fuel 
panels checked” 
LP     
 if BUS TIE CONN green  observe:  observe:  
17 call out “bus tie” LP     
       
 IF NOT GREEN:      
1 check bat.volt min 20V LP     
     
18 reset R generator, 2 attemp. LP     
 Items 19-226: the first engine 
start w.  ext. pwr 
     
19   ext pwr off LP    
 white light out   observe:  observe:  
20 disconnect sign. (time out) LP     
 ext pwr. blue light out  observe:  observe:  
 L/R gen light out  observe:  observe:  
21 load select R gen RP     
22 call out “ load below 200” RP     
 (- end -)      
  
 
                                                     
4 ABNORMAL = SHUTDOWN (CL Fuel Off) + MOTORING (Ignition Sw. Off / Starter Sw. L/R) + READING (abnormal checklist before next start attempt). 
5 Note that there is a L and R side of these panels and that only one side is checked at a time. The word “checked” means OK and it is wrong to say “checked” if any of the lights on the relevant 
panel side are on. If any of these lights are on, then it is correct to say noting (and to start investigating the system failure). When both system status and call out can be observed, then we 
score both, i.e. that the call out actually corresponds to the true system status and that the call out itself is verbally correct. 
6 Item 18 is the last regular item. Item 19-20 only when used ext. pwr. Items 19-22 after starting the first engine (load is checked before start of second engine only). 
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 ABNORMAL:      
1 CL fuel off ASAP   LP    
2    ignition sw. off ASAP LP    
3 hold starter sw until safe7 
minimum 10 sec. 
LP     
4 Read A. Checkl. hung/hot P     
 (wait min. 3 minutes)  (N/A)    
     
Hungstart:    
 if GPU (ext pwr.)      
1    voltage ext. pwr.    
 if battery:      
1    voltage battery    
 OTHER:      
  
    
                                                     
7 The starter can be engaged max 70 seconds total in one continuos sequence (each engine) and (of these 70 seconds) max 30 sec for motoring start. After one starter sequence, there must be a 
delay of 3 minutes. However: 1) it is not likely that motoring start requires 30 seconds, i.e. there should be more than 40 seconds left to motor the engines in case of abnormal starts and 2) if 
necessary:  it is better to damage the starter than the turbines. MOTORING (until ITT is below 150 degrees C) or MINIMUM 10 seconds. 
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10.2 The Error Potential 
 
The error potential was inserted into the checklist task (and scored in the checklist score 
sheet) dependent on pass number. Trainees did not know which pass that contained the in-
serted error potential; cockpit configuration during pre start/abnormal starts during engine 
start. Trainees were instructed not to discuss the error potential with other trainees. 
 
 
• Pre Start: the default configuration was the way it was left after the last flight of the day, 
according to the checklist. The inserted error potential was (1) the deliberate erroneous 
pre start cockpit configuration deviating from this default (described pass by pass, see be-
low). This created a potential for errors, specifically errors of (configuration) omission. 
 
• Engine Start: the error potential was also (2) the two types of abnormal starts: (a) the 
hung start and (b) the hot start. Explanation: The turbo prop engines have two turbines: 
the gas turbine and the power turbine. The gas turbine blows hot gasses into the power 
turbine, which in turn drives the propeller. Hung start (a): The gas turbine is supposed to 
accelerate during the starter process, i.e. the DC starter generator should only drive the 
gas turbine up to a certain rounds per minute (RPM). The gas turbine RPM is measured 
as a percentage of propeller speed (Ng), and the gas turbine could stop around 40 percent. 
It may look like the engine has started, but there is no combustion and it will eventually 
be noticed that the engine has not started. This is called a hung start (also called a hang 
start) and it can be detected directly from the Ng display. Hot start (b): The temperature 
between these two turbines, i.e. the inter-stage turbine temperature (ITT), must not reach 
a value where it can damage the turbines. Different types of problems during a start, in-
cluding hung start, may result in a hot start, which is the most serious scenario in terms of 
potential damage to the engine (turbines). 
 
• Hung and hot starts look (almost) the same in the current versions of the power plant 
trainer and the MATE. The MATE simulation should not be different from the simulation 
in the power plant trainer. This had as a consequence that the attempt to measure diagno-
sis (engine instructor score sheets, p 2) was disregarded. 
 
• Additional: the inserted malfunctioning of an engine, set by the instructor, constitutes a 
potential for errors. Another slightly complicating factor was the various types of normal 
starts, i.e. it is not an error potential, but it has some minor consequences for what actions 
should/should not be carried out: the engine can be started from external power, from bat-
teries or from the engine already started (i.e. generator). Performance was always scored 
in relation to the type of start being performed, noted on the front page of the score sheet 
(see appendix 11.1). 
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Error Potential during Pre Start: 
 
Not all the potentials for errors could be observed, i.e. the trainees’ detection of malfunctioning light 
bulps was only written down in the instructor notes during checkout. 
 
 
EXP - MATE - pre start - video log pass 1 - 4. (Instructions on how to use MATE is not included here) 
 
• This video log gives an overview of the 4 pre start passes in MATE. The cockpit configurations to 
be set by the instructor are described for each pass. It can also be commented on technical / practi-
cal problems related to the video recordings. 
 
• Before a crew starts the pre start checklist, make sure that the default configuration of switches, i.e. 
as the a/c was left by the previous crew (last flight of the day), is correct according to checklist and 
equal for all crews. During exercises it is always the first flight of the day. The only change to the 
default configuration is the inserted error potential. 
 
• The inserted error potential, i.e. deviations from the default configuration, must be the same for all 
trainees within one pass. Make sure trainees do not know the error potential before the exercise. 
 
• Sw positions can NOT be set from the instructor control station, but must be set manually. 
 
 
PASS 1 INTRODUCTION ONLY 
Default according to checklist: all mandatory sw must be off/in/guarded/safetied,  EXCEPT: AutoC. 
and Boot indicator must be on. Emerg.L. off. Inverter main. As required sw must be off.. 
 
PASS 2 FIRST INSERTED ERROR POTENTIAL                            -- COMMENTS 
Crew Date Ex Inserted error potential: 1) cargo light u/s, both bulbs (demonstration) 
   
 
PASS 3 OBSERVABLE ERROR POTENTIAL  (1)                          -- COMMENTS 
Crew Date Ex Inserted error potential: 1) One HP valve on, 2) No bat light u/s, both bulbs 
   
 
PASS 4  OBSERVABLE ERROR POTENTIAL  (1)                         -- COMMENTS 
Crew Date Ex Inserted error potential: 1) both gen sw on,  2) de-ice ovt light out, one bulb, 
  3) bat vent circuit breakers (N/A), 4) flight log missing (N/A) 
 
 
CHECKOUT, PASS 5: 
These four potentials for errors were used during the checkout pass 5. Potential number 1-3 
was for the training sample, potential number 4 was for the complete checkout sample: 
 
1) Auto C. off 
2) Win-shield ice x2 on 
3) No bat. Start u/s (none of the two light bulbs working, i.e. black caution light) 
-- 
4) Torch left side u/s, no battery, part of MEL 
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10.3 Error Categorisation Sheet 
 
 
The following score sheet (all the tables) represent one combined pre start and engine start 
trial for one crew combination. Usually one crew combination performed three trials (engine 
starts) within one session. Ideally there should be 10 sessions within a pass (5 crews in two 
combinations). We looked at the first three passes with combined pre start and engine starts 
in the FFS. 
 
 
Crew Letter LP: Crew Letter RP: 
Pass:  
 
 
Pre-start checklist FFS (config errors) 
Flow Omission Commission Total 
    
 
 
Engine start FFS 
Left engine: Right engine: Normal start: Abnormal start: 
    
Operational defini-
tion (v. 6.0) of Sky-
ways extended 
checklist  
(v. 960901) 
Config errors 
(switches and con-
trols in relation to 
checklist and system 
status) 
Callout errors   
(command and call-
out phraseology in 
relation to checklist 
and system status) 
Role errors 
(reversal of whom is 
performing the 
checklist actions) 
Flow    
Flow (timing)    
Omission    
Omission (transition)    
Commission    
Total    
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10.4 What-To-Do-List for Instructors 
 
These have been additional to briefing. The instructions were written in one normal (short) and one 
extended (detailed) version for all conditions. Camera instruction manuals were enclosed. 
 
 
What-To-Do-List for Skyways FFS Instructors 
 
SIMULTANIOUS RECORDINGS: pre st. & engine start (both running) 
 
CHECK: 
1) Pictures in camera monitors: overhead panel + throttles 
2) Focus, adjust if not OK (“throttle” camera is locked) 
3) Illumination (all light on) and exposure (AE) 
 
COMPLETE THE SCORE SHEET FOR EACH CREW IN EACH PASS 
 
LABEL: 
1) While recording: state crew ID letter and pass number + show letter 
2) Write on tape: date, instructor ID, crew ID and pass number. 
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10.5 Instructor Notes, pre start 
 
 
EXP - A/C PRE START CHECKOUT INSTRUCTOR NOTES.  Pass number 5, 6 or 7:  __________       (number) 
 
 
Crew ID Date Time Error 1-4 Other Errors Observed? Tot. Err. Res. OK COMMENTS (why OK/not OK) 
       /K / Tot.      
       /L / Tot.      
       /M / Tot.      
       /N / Tot.      
       /O / Tot.      
       /P / Tot.      
       /Q / Tot.      
       /R / Tot.      
       /S / Tot.      
       /T / Tot.      
 
Maximum allowed time is 15 minutes, (i.e. a formal checkout / CTR). If trainees delay at checklist items that are not a part of MATE (only “simulated” in MATE), 
they must be told to continue the checkout: The instructor must monitor this during the checkout. 
 
Inserted error potential: 
1) Auto C. off 
2) Win-shield ice x2 on 
3) No bat. Start u/s (none of the two light bulbs working, i.e. black caution light) 
-- 
4) Torch left side u/s, no battery, part of MEL; N/A for comparison EXP-CTR pass 5, but please insert in pass 7 if pass 5 & 6 fails 
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10.6 Instructor Score Sheets, pre start 
 
This score sheet was produced in several versions dependent on the condition 
 
CONFIDENTIAL - TO BE HANDED OVER TO RISØ EXPERIMENTER 
 
Instructor score sheet for EXP (MATE) pre start CHECKOUT in a/c 
 
Instructor initials:   Crew member letter K-T:  
Pass no. 5, 6 or 7:   Date:  
 
Please circle the number you think indicates the pilot’s level of ability in each cate-
gory at this stage of training. By definition, an average pilot will receive a “3”. 
 
1. Pilot’s knowledge of the cockpit-layout 
How well does the pilot know the location of the controls and indicators? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 Comments: 
low            high 
 
2. Speed in carrying out the pre start checklist 
How fast does the pilot carry out the task (compared to other trainees)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 Comments: 
low            high 
 
3. Task accuracy 
Was there a high number of errors in carrying out the checklist? (A failure to visually inspect a parame-
ter will also count as an error: if possible, the trainee should be asked to point at the parameter or report 
verbally when performing the check.) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 Comments: 
low            high 
 
4. Understanding of a/c systems: actions outside normal checklist 
Knowledge of how the a/c system variables underlying the procedure are related to each other. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 Comments: 
low            high 
 
5. Predicted level of performance in the three first FFS passes (after checkout) 
An estimate of how the FFS instructor will evaluate the pilot. 
 
Lower 
Third 
Medium 
Third 
Upper 
Third 
Comments: 
 
 
Insert malfunctions/error potential before each checkout. Register on separate notes: 
1) Auto C. off, 2) Win-shield ice x2 on, 3) No bat. Start u/s (none of the two light bulbs 
working, i.e. black caution light) 4) torch left side u/s: no battery, part of MEL; N/A for 
comparison EXP-CTR pass 5, but please insert in pass 7 if pass 5 & 6 fails. 
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10.7 Instructor Score Sheets, engine start 
 
This score sheet was in several versions depending on the condition. Page 2 was taken 
out because the measure of diagnosis had to be disregarded. 
 
CONFIDENTIAL - TO BE HANDED OVER TO RISØ EXPERIMENTER 
 
Instructor score sheet for pre start/engine start FFS passes 
 
 
Instructor initials:   Crew letters (K-T): / 
Pass no. (“Lesson SIM”) 1-7:   Date 1998: / 
 
Please complete this score sheet (2 pages) for each CREW  in each pass.  
Write N/A when an item is Not Applicable. 
 
The trainees must  not know if the start will be normal or abnormal. 
 
Type of Normal Engine Start: 
 
 
 
Please insert the same type of error potential, i.e. equal difficulty for all crews, within 
one pass. 
 
Inserted Error Potential 
Pre Start: overhead switch positions deviating from the default: 
 
 
 
Abnormal Engine Start: type of inserted malfunction; “hung start” or “hot start”: 
 
 
 
 
 
Please circle the number you think indicates the pilot’s level of performance. 
By definition, an average pilot will receive a “3”: 
 
 
1. Please indicate the level of performance on the pre-start checklist: 
 
1 
Low 
2 3 
Average 
4 5 
High 
 
 
2. Please indicate the level of performance on normal engine start: 
 
1 
Low 
2 3 
Average 
4 5 
High 
 
 
3. Please indicate the level of performance on abnormal engine start (hung or hot): 
 
1 
Low 
2 3 
Average 
4 5 
High 
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10.8 Trainees’ and Instructors’ Opinioins 
 Questionnaires 
 
Trainees’ Opinions of MATE 
 
Your time in completing this questionnaire is greatly appreciated. 
Please answer within the 15th of August and deliver your answers to xxx xxx. All an-
swers will be treated anonymously. 
 
 
Crew ID letter: ________ Date: __________ 
 
We would prefer to have your answers in English, but answer in 
Swedish if this is important for the accuracy of your descriptions. Use both sides of the 
pages if you need more space. Please make your handwriting as clear as possible. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. What are your main opinions of the MATE as a training environment for the 
course you have just completed? Please describe the most important positive 
and/or negative aspects you can think of (A-C): 
 
 
A) How is the MATE compared with the Paper Tiger? 
 
 
B)    How is the MATE compared with the Power Plant Trainer? 
 
 
C) How is the MATE compared with the Aircraft (pre start)? 
 
 
2. Did you consider it a problem to operate the touch screen switches? (Circle) 
 
Yes  No 
 
If yes, please describe the problem in relation to the specific switches: 
 
 
3. Do you think that the MATE aspects you have described in questions 1-2 have 
influenced your performance in the real environments A/C and FFS? (Circle) 
 
Yes  No 
 
If yes, please describe this influence for each relevant aspect of the MATE: 
 
 
4. Any other comments: 
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Instructors’ Opinions of MATE 
 
Your time in completing this questionnaire is greatly appreciated. 
Please answer within the 15th of August and deliver your answers to xxx xxx. 
All answers will be treated anonymously. 
 
 
Name: __________________________________________   Date: __________ 
 
 
Please circle your direct and/or indirect experience with MATE as an instructor: 
 
 
A/C checkout   -   MATE   -   FFS   -   Other, specify:____________________ 
 
 
If you do not have any MATE relevant instructor experience (directly in MATE or indi-
rectly in the A/C checkout or FFS), but you do have some knowledge of the MATE 
(Other, specify), then please comment on a general basis. Write N/A (Not Applicable) if 
you do not have any opinions of the MATE. We would prefer to have your answers in 
English, but answer in Swedish if this is important for the accuracy of your descriptions. 
Use both sides of the pages if you need more space. Please make your handwriting as 
clear as possible. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. What are your main opinions of the MATE as a training environment for the 
Saab 340 course at Skyways? Please describe the most important positive and/or 
negative aspects you can think of (A-C): 
 
A) How is the MATE compared with the Paper Tiger? 
 
B) How is the MATE compared with the Power Plant Trainer? 
 
C) How is the MATE compared with the Aircraft (pre start)? 
 
2. Do you consider it a problem to operate the touch screen switches? (Circle) 
 
Yes  No 
 
If yes, please describe the problem in relation to the specific switches: 
 
 
3. Do you think that the MATE aspects you have described in questions 1–2 influ-
enced the trainees’ performances in the real environments A/C and FFS? (Circle) 
 
Yes  No 
 
If yes, please describe this influence for each relevant aspect of the MATE: 
 
 
4. How do you think that MATE can improve pilot education and/or training? 
 
Please take cost-effectiveness into consideration and also include comments and sugges-
tions related to: 
 
• Education/training of pilots that are new to a specific a/c type. 
• Education/training of pilots with experience on a specific a/c type (e.g. CRM). 
• Any suggestions for the further development and use of MATE. 
 
5. Any other comments: 
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